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1. Introduction 
The complexity of present man-made systems has reached an unprecedented level. In fact 
any system is grounded on computer technologies in the sense that it contains computer 
elements or is modeled or supported with the help of computer. This trend resulted in new 
opportunities and at the same time caused additional difficulties. Shortcomings in 
integration of scientific, engineering, management, and financial areas, which are used to 
ensure an effective system development and employment, now become more obvious. 
Today processes of system life cycle in different conditions and threats are the main objects 
for forecasting, analysis and optimization. Indeed these objective changes become the main 
reason for establishing the first system engineering ISO/IEC standard ISO/IEC 15288 
“System Engineering - System Life Cycle Processes" (since 2002). Covering systems in 
industrial, energetic, transport, aerospace, military and other fields, this standard 
recommends to perform only the actions that were substantiated and not to act in the 
directions, which were not estimated and justified. It means that feature of our time is the 
turn to system engineering – see Figure 1. 
Up-to-date approach to system maturity refers us to international standards ISO 9001 and 
9004, ISO/IEC 15026, 15504, CММI etc. It is clear without "system analysts" there is not 
achievable the highest level “Optimizing”, but also a previous “Predictable” level. However 
many customers and Chief Designers often fail to take quantitative system requirements 
into consideration, they do so wittingly or through an oversight. From now on these 
omissions do not conform to the requirements of the international standards. It is only the 
beginning. What will be the continuation?  
Nowadays if comprehensive quantitative system requirements were not established in 
quality management, the system efficiency and customer satisfaction can not be controlled 
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and confirmed. To great regret in many application areas the system requirements do not 
allow to understand the true reasons of failures. However the degree of processes influences 
on a final result should be estimated and often may be managed! Let’s consider information 
system. Standards recommend to propose requirements for system reliability during given 
period, for the information timeliness, completeness, actuality, faultlessness after checking, 
correctness of processing, protection against dangerous influences and unauthorized 
accesses, and if needed information confidentiality. It means that those system requirements 
should be set that are focused on customer satisfaction according to used information.  
 
Figure 1. Now applicable models, methods, software tools and technologies support standard system 
requirements 
Unfortunately many graduates from technical colleges and universities do not use the 
foundations of "system analysis", "operations research", "mathematical modelling" in quality 
management, they missed the particulars of existing methods and models. And without use 
of mathematical models they can only dream about deep logical investigation to predict 
forthcoming effects. That pawns the doubtful base of high risks to the future systems. There 
is more deeper increasing break between needs for competitive system quality and 
methodical opportunities of the experts, called these needs to estimate, substantiate and 
satisfy without wasted expenses. Time has come to make again more popular mathematical 
models for rational solving the problems of quality management. 
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The goal of this work is to propose models, methods, and software tools well-tested in 
practice, for forecasting quality and risks as applied to newly developed and currently 
operated manufacture, power generation, transport, engineering, information, control and 
measurement, food storage, quality assurance and security systems. Presented work is 
devoted to the researches of standard processes for providing effective quality management 
in systems life cycle. It covers logically closed contour: « system requirements of standards – 
supporting mathematical models to estimate probabilities of success, risks, profits and 
damages – ways of rational management». Thereby the reader can substantiate answers on 
system engineering questions: «How to reach in quality management the level of 
international standards?», «Is expected quality achievable?», «Can be the system 
requirements met?», «How much safe are those or others scenarios?», «What about the real 
risks, profits and possible damages?», «What choice is rational?», «What measures are more 
effective?», «What rational measures should lead to estimated effect without waste 
expenses, when, by which controllable and uncontrollable conditions and costs?» and 
others. The answers may be received before critical events (not only after these events). 
While reading this work, the reader will be shipped in logic of standard processes, which 
can spend resources and be compared on a timeline in different conditions. This implies an 
understanding of system requirements, strength of mathematical models and optimization 
methods, i. e. everything that is vitally important but has never been in the focus of attention 
of either technical specialists or students. Certainly, in the justification of such indifference it 
is possible to refer to doubts of the famous physicist Albert Einstein. He has spoken, as far as 
the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain, and as far as they are certain, 
they do not refer to reality. But now we are living at the time of innovations! While 
understanding that this century-old dictum is negative for the chances of our work to be a 
success, we nevertheless decided not to ‘loose’ advanced physicists for the sake of their own 
interests. Thereto 10 practical examples are investigated and explained, the detailed 
‘hardware’ of the work, other hundreds examples and routine comments are gathered at the 
References of the book and on site www.mathmodels.net. These new results are a humble 
initial contribution of author’s to the ‘coin-box’ of the knowledge base for decision support 
to improve quality management, boost the efficiency and safety of different systems and/or 
reduction of nonproductive costs.  
And now we can review briefly our own experience. There is an inconceivable ocean of 
practical problems which are subjects to the decision with use of system forecasting. 
Existing decisions from one area are far from being always appeared applicable in other 
areas. As a result in 9 cases from 10 it was necessary to create original mathematical models. 
Their quantity grew. Further, having analyzed problems and approaches to the decision of 
system engineering, there was clear uniformity of a train of thought of modern system 
analysts in various spheres. The logic scheme everywhere is identical: at first the set of 
destabilizing factors and threats against quality and-or safety is defined, then taking into 
account available resources the possible measures of neutralization should be chosen or 
developed. A vulnerability set of system comes to light. Technologies of system control and 
recovery of broken integrity should be implemented as counteraction against destabilizing 
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factors and threats (there where expediently - continuous monitoring of conditions is used). 
Thus at every step of system life cycle the development of processes is supported by 
probabilistic forecasts, criteria of optimization are chosen in depending on the problem 
purposes. According to these rational decisions are made on the base of mathematical 
modelling and optimization.  
Natural tests of road also are fraught with serious consequences. Therefore mathematical 
modelling becomes more and more popular. For this reason the described universal scheme 
of the system analysis has laid down in a basis of the presented below models methods and 
software tools. Modelling shouldn’t be carried out only for modelling itself. If as a result of 
modelling we get only one value it is not quite clear how we should appreciate it (such a 
disadvantage is typical for simulation models, which require thousands executions of the 
same data, what is not made sometimes because of time-shortage; inverse problems solving 
is almost impossible for such kind of models). That is why the offered software tool suites, 
which uses only analytical models, is developed in such a way that it is possible in a split 
second to carry out computations, catch tendencies, reveal stability of processes in case of 
input data changes in the range –50% +200% and in a few minutes (!) to find admissible 
solutions of complex inverse synthesis problems. As a result of the offered models use a 
system analyst gets an ability to sense not a computed point but the whole quality field, 
which may be appropriate to system at different scenarios of system operation and 
environment behavior. Why you should trust to evaluating results by the offered models? In 
other words how models adequacy is substantiated? Though any answer to these questions 
won’t be irrefragable for a certain system we shall try to formulate our arguments 
(experience readers understand that any model needs in similar arguments). 
Argument 1. The fact is that while shaping models all mathematical results are initially 
drawn in the integral form. As input data are somehow connected with time after choosing 
distribution functions characterizing these data there were selected the gamma – 
distribution and the Erlang’s distribution. Mathematicians know that these distributions 
approximate sums of positively distributed random variables well. Every temporary data 
are as a matter of fact such a sum of compound time expenses. Studies of regularities (Feller, 
1971) have shown that extremes are achieved on bounds of these distributions, i.e. of 
exponential and deterministic (discrete) distributions. Thus, real values will be somewhere 
between lower and upper estimations of the software tools, if computation results are 
presented by one curved line they are lower estimations. The results reflect pessimistic value 
for following using. 
Argument 2. As a basis of our models we used the probability theory and the theory of 
regenerative processes (i.e. recurring processes). Proofs of basic theoretical results are 
received, for example, by (Gnedenko, 1973; Klimov, 1983). If to return in the 70-s of the last 
century we may remember the boom of mathematical modelling, defining calls flow reliable 
and time-probabilistic characteristics. The boom passed and appeared the reliability theory, 
the queuing theory and a variety of models, which proved themselves to be effective. There 
are created standards and other normative documents regulating system methodical 
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evaluations on the basis of these models. Nowadays these models are widely used and 
trusted because they produce reliable results confirmed in the course of time. It is worth to 
remind that these created theories and models are based on the probability theory and the 
theory of regenerative processes. The models of subsections 3.2 – 3.4 are the classical models 
of the 70-s improved and developed to meet the requirements of the present time. The other 
models are created on the basis of the limit theorem for regenerative processes developed in 
the 70-80-s in Moscow State University on the faculty of computing mathematics and 
cybernetics.  
Argument 3. Skilled analysts know that if a probabilistic analytical model is incorrect then if 
input data are changed in the range from - to + there are always errors appearing either 
in infraction the probability theory laws or in illogic of dependencies behavior (most 
probably on the bounds of possible values) or in impossibility of obtained effects physical 
explanation. Bounds of input data in the offered software tools are assigned in the range 
from - to + (more precisely from 10-8 milliseconds to 108 years). Three-year testing of 
models including beta testing by fifty different independent companies raise confidence in 
software tools algorithmic correctness. 
Argument 4. As far as possible any designer tends to use several models of different 
authors. If results of different models use are not divergent a designer begins to trust not 
only to results but also to the models. Comparison of results of the presented software tools 
with results of other models use proved their high adequacy (concerning computations of 
reliability and time-probabilistic characteristics, the other models don’t have analogues). 
The offered software tools are an original Russian creation patented. They have been 
presented at seminars, symposiums, conferences, ISO/IEC working groups and other 
forums since 2000 in Russia, Australia, Canada, China, Finland, France, Germany, Kuwait, 
Luxembourg, Poland, Serbia, Ukraine, the USA, etc. The software tools were awarded by the 
Golden Medal of the International Innovation and Investment Salon and the International 
Exhibition “Intellectual Robots”, acknowledged on the World's fair of information 
technologies CeBIT in Germany, noted by diplomas of the Hanover Industrial Exhibition 
and the Russian exhibitions of software. The offered technology of modelling through the 
Internet has been acknowledged as the best project-2007 by the National Association of 
Innovations and Developments of Information Technologies of Russia.  
Having analyzed results of long-term our practice, we, authors, have noticed the following. 
Many scientific researches, practical investigations, implementations and recommendations 
based on use of our models, methods, and software tools were bringing increasingly deep 
satisfaction not only to ourselves but, most important:  
- to developers, i. e. all of our colleagues involved in the works (since the obtained results 
can be proved step-by-step and their usefulness checked; forecasts were confirmed in 
time; and, respectively, the number of profitable orders has been growing),  
- to customers (since we managed to convince them that the residual system risks may 
and should be mitigated proactively; and now they have scientific justification of the 
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amount of investments adequate to achieved quality and safety levels that may be 
guaranteed for the allocated money),  
- to users (the forecast made in time has mobilized them on the basis of the ‘forewarned 
is forearmed’ concept; using our recommendations, in utilization stage they can extract 
from the system the best effects, that were assumed in concept, design&development 
and support stages). 
This work is purposed for systems analysts from customers, developers, users, as well as 
investigators and staff of quality and security management, experts of testing laboratories 
and certification bodies. It can be used in system life cycle to form system requirements, 
compare different processes, substantiate technical decisions, carrying out tests, adjust 
technological parameters, estimate quality and risks. The decisions, scientifically proved by 
the offered models and software tools, can provide purposeful essential improvement of 
quality and mitigation of risks and decrease expenses for created and operating systems. 
The spectrum of the explored systems is indeed broad; it includes systems operated by 
government agencies, manufacturing structures (including enterprises, oil-and-gas and 
transport facilities, and hazardous production systems), food storage, power generation, 
financial and business, aviation and space industry, emergency services, municipal 
economy, military, etc. Moreover, our assessments and forecasts are generated much faster, 
feature innovations, have invariably high quality and, most important, the expected effects 
may be easily interpreted (what specifically is the result and how it can be reached) 
regardless of whether it pertains to increase in gains or reduction in losses. Eventually, 
having gained experience and being sure that those instruments are of use, we decided to 
share our knowledge and skills for analyzing and optimizing system processes in quality 
management. It should be stressed from the very beginning that no one forces you to use 
these proposed models, methods, and software tools. Any author trusts primarily his/her 
own models and is suspicious about someone else’s if uses them at all. From this perspective 
we also understand our colleagues from the writers’ community, share their doubts and 
nevertheless invite them... Join us, the esteemed reader. The knowledge that you will gain 
after even brief acquaintance with the work or just browsing the book and then 
comprehending its content will not allow you to continue unsystematic life without 
forecasting quality and risks! You can easily verify this author’s forecast.  
2. Review of system processes to reveal general engineering problems 
that are due to be solved by the mathematical modeling 
System analysis is an important science intensive process, which is connected with system 
concept, development, production, utilization and support. As a result of adequate system 
analysis we extend our knowledge about systems, obtained quality dependency on different 
system characteristics and about a degree of system purposes achievement. This knowledge 
allows a customer to formulate substantiated requirements and specifications, a developer - 
to implement them rationally without wasted expenses, a user – to use system potential in 
the most effective way. Let’s review some system standards - ISO 9001 “Quality 
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Management Systems - Requirements”, ISO/IEC 15288 “System Engineering – System Life 
Cycle Processes”, ISO/IEC 12207 “Information Technology - Software Life Cycle Processes”, 
ISO/IEC 15504 “Information Technology –Process Assessment”, ISO/IEC 17799 “Code of 
Practice for Information Security Management”, IEC 60300 «Dependability Management», 
IEC 61508 “Functional safety of electrical/ electronic/ programmable electronic safety-related 
systems”, CMMI “Capability Maturity Model Integration”, “GOST RV 51987 “Information 
technology. Set of standards for automated system. The typical requirements and metrics for 
information systems operation quality. General provisions”, some standards for use in the 
oil&gas industry (ISO 10418 “Basic surface safety systems”, ISO 13702 “Control & mitigation 
of fire & explosion”, ISO 14224 “Reliability/maintenance data”, ISO 15544 “Emergency 
response”, ISO 15663 “Life cycle costing”, ISO 17776 “Assessment of hazardous situations” 
etc. - from the role of system analysis point of view. These are the representative part of the 
modern system and software engineering standards. 
In compliance with ISO 9001 to all processes there can be applied methodology known as 
“Plan-Do-Check-Act” (PDCA). Plan: from system analysis point of view it means that all 
parties should understand in equal measure the essence of customer requirements, metrics 
and admissible level of goals achievement. Do: it implies that implemented processes meet 
customer requirement on admissible level. Check: there should be used methods and tools 
for evaluations. Act: used methods should allow appearing dependencies and determining 
adequately an effective way for expected improvement. For any improvement a 
documented procedure shall be established to define requirements for determining potential 
nonconformities and their causes, evaluating the need for action to prevent occurrence of 
nonconformities, determining and implementing action needed.  
In compliance with the standard ISO/IEC 15288 system analysis actions are the main actions 
for achievement system purposes in life cycle including required propositions in 
Agreement, Enterprise, Project and Technical Processes. In compliance with the standards 
ISO/IEC 12207 system analysis problems are to be solved to meet system requirements with 
resources optimization. The standard ISO/IEC 17799 is used for providing information 
security purposes. This and others like standards in security area (for example, ISO/IEC 
15443, ISO/IEC 13335 etc.) imply that high effectiveness of system protection measures 
should be evaluated and confirmed quantitatively. It means that any system security 
evaluations need in an adequate mathematical methodology. The standard IEC 60300 
describes the approaches to the risk analysis of technological systems from system analysis 
point of view. The standard IEC 61508 includes Parts “Examples of methods for the 
determination of safety integrity levels” and “Overview of techniques and measures” that 
recommend to evaluate system risks. An application of CMMI allows selecting the order of 
improvement that best meets the organization’s business objectives and mitigates the 
organization’s areas of risk. And these results are also based on system analysis.  
To understand the situation with requirements and applicable methods to analize and 
optimize system processes an existing practices for providing system quality and safety 
were reviewed. The integral results of safety analysis are presented on Figure 2.  
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Some situations with modelling of processes for system quality are more wide viewed in 
this book. According to applicable mathematical models everyone (majority) solves the 
problems “how can”, we can resume: all organizations need quantitative estimations, but 
only some part from them uses modelling complexes; used models are highly specialized, 
input and calculated metrics are adhered strongly to specificity of systems; existing 
modelling complexes have been created within the limits of concrete order for the systems 
and as a rule are very expensive. 
Thus the summary of the analysis of existing approaches is the next. 
1. Analysis of quality and risks is carried out mainly at qualitative level with assessments 
“better or worse”. Independent quantitative estimations at probability level are carried 
out for specially created models. 
2. Generally risk estimations from one sphere do not use in other spheres because of 
methodologies for risk analysis are different, interpretations are not identical. The 
methods for quantitatively risk analysis and quality analysis (on probability level) are 
in creating stage yet. The terms “Acceptable quality” and “Admissible risk” in use 
should be defined on probability scale level only in dependence on corresponding 
methods. As consequence probability estimations are not comparable for different 
areas, experience from other spheres is missing, comparisons for systems from different 
areas, as a rule, are not used, as universal objective scale of measurement is not 
established yet. 
3. In all cases effective risk management for any system is based on: a) uses of materials, 
resources, protective technologies with more best characteristics from the point of view 
of safety, including integrity recovery; b) rational use of situation analysis, effective 
ways of the control and monitoring of conditions and operative recovery of integrity; c) 
rational use of measures for risk counteraction. 
4. It does not allow to solve the main problems of a substantiation of system requirements 
to parameters of information gathering and analysis, control, monitoring and 
counteraction measures at restrictions, and also to confirm about efficiency of the 
prevent measures for providing quality and safety!  
Note. System integrity is defined as such system state when system purposes are achieved 
with the required quality.  
In general case system methods for analyzing and optimizing are founded completely on 
the mathematical modelling of system processes. We understand that any process is a 
repeated sequence of consuming time and resources for outcome receiving. In general case 
the moments for any activity beginning and ending are, in mathematical words, random 
events on time line. Moreover, there exists the general property of all process architectures. 
It is a repeated performance for majority of timed activities (evaluations, comparisons, 
selections, controls, analysis etc.) during system life cycle - for example see on Figure 3 the 
problems that are due to be solved by the mathematical modelling of processes according to 
ISO/IEC 15288. 
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Figure 2. Conclusions of safety analysis 
This work focuses on the way for extracting latent system effects from system processes by 
using universal metrics: probabilities of success or failure during a given period for an 
element, subsystem, system. Calculation of these metrics within the limits of the offered 
probability space built on the basis of the theory for random processes, will allow to predict 
outcomes on an uniform scale, quantitatively to prove levels of acceptable quality and 
admissible risks, to solve the problems of synthesis, answering preventive a question « What 
rational measures should lead to estimated effect without waste expenses, when, by which 
controllable and uncontrollable conditions and costs?». 
Below we describe many-sided analysis of quality management. Thus we want to help the 
reader in solving problems of providing system effectiveness, which depends on both the 
reviewed system quality parameters and the parameters of pragmatic usefulness in a certain 
domain. They cover many important engineering problems in a systems life cycle - see 
Figure 4.  
There exist different process-centered methods and integrated tool suites for systems 
analysis (see for instance Guide to the Software Engineering Body of Knowledge SWEBOK). 
In sections 3 and 4 we illustrate the original approaches based on mathematical modelling. 
Many analysis and synthesis problems and their solutions are demonstrated in section 5. 
However detailed mathematical definition for all problems is omitted not to overload a 
reader by complicated mathematical propositions, which require deep knowledge of the 
probability theory, theory of regenerative processes and mathematical analysis. You may 
find full mathematical models and their proofs (Martin (1972); Gnedenko (1973); Kleinrock 
(1976), Matweev & Ushakov (1984) etc.).  
As a resume we can define the role of analysis and optimization system processes in 
compliance with modern engineering standards as decisive for rational reaching system 
operation quality. From analyst’s point of view system analysis reduces system 
uncertainties and provides a quantitative basis to predict and choice in balancing business 
needs, quality, risks and specified requirements. 
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Figure 3. The problems that are due to be solved by mathematical modelling of processes 
 
Figure 4. System engineering problems which are solved on the base of system analysis in quality 
management 
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As the first objects for demonstrating author’s original approach to analyze and optimize 
system processes the information systems (IS) are selected. We will not attract readers’ 
attention listing uncountable features of IS because the effect of their implementations is 
obvious in all spheres of human activities.  
3. Models and software tools to analyze information system processes  
3.1. General propositions  
On information technology market there is offered a wide choice of engineering solutions 
that are able to satisfy functional requirements of a customer. You may choose an acceptable 
variant if you are guided by logical considerations. The thing is that you cannot be sure 
whether this variant is rational or not if to estimate it from the point of view of integral 
system operation goals achievement. The answer is likely to be positive if the technological 
solution is intended for an enterprise system, which goal is to get the highest benefit from 
goods manufacturing and sale. In this case the criterion for choosing a manufacturing 
computer system may be the one of upgrading goods quality and increasing the company 
profits under expenses limitations. And what will be the answer if to speak about IS, which 
production is output information? The criterion for providing IS high quality is the use of 
models and methods that allow to estimate, investigate and optimize processes of 
information gathering, processing, storage and producing. The basis for the functions 
performance is the integration of computers, software, communications and human 
capabilities. IS are the most important integral components of financial, transport, energy, 
customs, military and other SYSTEMS.  
It is clear that requirements to IS operation depend on general SYSTEM purposes, use 
conditions (including potential threats), available resources, information sources facilities 
and communication requirements (see Figure 5). There is impossible to provide IS operation 
quality without the help of models and implementation tools. Its use allows to estimate the 
reliability and timeliness of information producing, the completeness, validity and 
confidentiality of the used information from users’ point of view. This is the logical basis to 
create universal mathematical models and software tools which could estimate IS operation 
quality, compare various IS engineering projects, reveal "bottle-necks" and optimize the 
processes of information gathering, storage and processing. Such original mathematical 
models have been introduced in processes of IS development, use and maintenance. 
The idea of estimating IS operation quality appeared as a result of studying potential threats 
to output information (see Figure 6). The results of their use to analyze technical solutions in 
processes of designing, developing, producing, using, supporting and certifying proved 
their effectiveness and multifunctional capabilities. 
The main windows for choosing the mathematical models is illustrated on Figure 7. The 
modelling software tools complex CEISOQ+ is one of the few scientific and technical 
masterpieces, which satisfy most of the high requirements of the intellectual market. 
Moreover, this complex has appeared quite in time. The market requires the quantitative 
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substantiation of engineering solutions and the IS quality validation. It is pleasant that 
CEISOQ+ developed by those who work in the field of defense reveals a new conceptual 
approach to quality. 
 
Figure 5. The place and the purpose of information system in a SYSTEM 
 
Figure 6. Potential threats to output information according to general purpose of IS operation 
The created modelling Complex for Evaluation of Information Systems Operation Quality 
(CEISOQ+) allows to simplify and to spread the use of the next mathematical models: of 
functions performance by a system in conditions of unreliability of its components; complex 
of calls processing; of entering into IS current data concerning new objects of application 
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domain; complex of information gathering from sources; of information analysis; of 
dangerous influences on a protected system; of an unauthorized access to system resources. 
The offered original mathematical models intended for estimating the level of the IS 
operation purpose achievement are supported by the created software tools CEISOQ+.  
 
Figure 7. The main windows of software tools CEISOQ+ 
To make the understanding easier we didn’t take into detail consideration that information 
quality depends on kind of input information, on functional tasks to be accomplished and 
on different users’ requirements to conditions of IS operation. These dependencies were 
studied in a special complex IS operation quality investigation (Kostogryzov et al. (1994, 
2000-2002)).  
The software tools CEISOQ may be applied for solving such system problems appearing in 
an information systems life cycle as: substantiation of quantitative system requirements to 
hardware, software, users, staff, technologies; requirements analysis; estimation of project 
engineering decisions and possible danger; detection of bottle-necks; investigation of 
problems concerning potential threats to system operation and information security; testing, 
verification and validation of IS operation quality; rational optimization of IS technological 
parameters; substantiation of plans, projects and directions for effective system utilization, 
improvement and development.  
Every system analyst (an IS customer, designer, developer, expert of testing laboratories and 
certification bodies etc.) may become a user of the software tools CEISOQ+. The CEISOQ+ 
may also be helpful in training programs for skilled specialists and educational programs of 
students studying information systems estimation. 
The use of models and the software tools CEISOQ+ on different stages of an IS life cycle 
allows to answer the following questions: what quantitative requirements should be to 
hardware/software devices operation time between failures and to system repair time? 
which information operation processes should be duplicated and how? what processing 
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devices and technologies should be chosen to achieve the necessary level of system 
throughput? what about the system tolerance to data flows changing? what data flows and 
functional tasks may be considered as the main causes of bottlenecks? what level of 
preparation, transfer and input productivity and what data gathering technologies can 
guarantee the completeness and actuality of information? which engineering solutions can 
provide the actuality of information? what about the quantitative level of information 
control quality? what qualification quantitative requirements should be for the staff and 
users? how dangerous are scenarios of environment influences and what protective 
technologies will provide the required security? how the use of protective technologies will 
influence on the IS operation quality characteristics? how the use of integrity diagnostics 
and security monitoring will worsen time-probabilistic characteristics of a system? what 
protection system effectiveness should be to prevent an unauthorized access? what about 
quantitative level of information security risks? etc. 
This appendix is dedicated to building a probabilistic space (, B, P) for the evaluation of 
system operation processes, where:  - is a limited space of elementary events; B – a class of 
all subspace of -space, satisfied to the properties of -algebra; P – a probability measure on 
a space of elementary events . Because, ={k} is limited, there is enough to establish a 
reflection wkpk =P(wk) like that kp 0  and  1k
k
p .  
Such space (, B, P) is proposed on the base of processes architectures formalization by the 
limited theorems for regenerative processes (Feller (1971), Gnedenko (1973), Klimov (1983), 
etc.) and also by using principal propositions of probability theory and theory for random 
processes. The proofs of the mathematical formulas used by the CEISOQ+, see (Kostogryzov 
et al. (1994, 2000-2002)). 
3.2. Reliability of information producing  
Problems of reliability have been solved already as related to technical means and systems 
but they are extremely urgent concerning. The reliability standards require 
acknowledgement of these values achievement. It is clear that without modelling 
acknowledgement of IS reliability, which consists of dozens territorially distributed software 
resources, may be obtained only as a result of its use. Such a use is a risk and every risk 
must be substantiated. Indeed there is no choice except modelling.  
Modelling of functions performance reliability may be carried out with the help of the next 
model. 
What about the logical idea for modelling processes from the point of view to provide 
reliability of information producing? From the point of formal reliability any system, 
subsystem or their components may be in “operable” or in “inoperable” condition during 
given period . Let an operable condition is identified with the formulated condition 
“component provides reliable functions performance during period  ”. Period, connected 
with system repairing after failure, is signed as “system does not provide reliable functions 
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performance during period ”. Then both mentioned conditions complete the set of 
elementary events for stochastic process rel.(t) defining the system condition at the time t 
and functionality for period  after t, i.e. 
rel.
“system provides reliable functions performance during period ,”
if system is in operable condition before moment t and during period begun at the moment ;
(t)
“system does not provide reliable funξ t


ctions performance during period ,”
if system is in inoperable condition at the moment or a failure will be during period begun at the moment .t t



The next variants are possible: 
a) a virtual moment t has overtaken the system in operable condition and there has not been 
a failure during period  (failure means change from operable in inoperable condition), in 
this case system operation is characterized by condition “system provides reliable functions 
performance during period ”, i.e. the event of reliable functions performing is going on; 
b) a failure has happened during period , in this case system operation is characterized by 
conditions “system does not provide reliable functions performance during period ”; 
c) system is not capable for functions performing because one is in inoperable conditions at 
the moment t. Then it is going on the event “system does not provide reliable functions 
performance during period ”. 
The next statement 1 is proposed on the base of introduced formalization. 
Statement 1. The limited probability of providing reliable function performance by system 
during the required time exists under the condition of existence for stationary probability 
distributions for considered characteristics and their independence. One is equal to 
  
0
( ) * ( ) ,P dN dt td N W t 
              rel 0 tV - t  (1) 
where N(t) - is the probability distribution function (PDF) of time between neighboring 
failures (TMTBFnk is the mean time); W(t) – is the PDF of repair time (Trep. is the mean time); 
V(t) – is the required period PDF of permanent system operation when reliability should be 
provided (Treq. is the mean time);* - is the convolution sign. 
The proof of this and others statements of the chapter 3 see (Kostogryzov et al. (1994, 2000-
2002)) and site www.mathmodels.net. 
Convolution of complex system framework into framework for one unit is implemented by 
usual methods (see, for example subchapter 4). The final clear analytical formulas for 
modelling are received by Lebesgue – integration (1) expression and convolution of complex 
system framework in to single-unit system. 
The next variants are used in modelling of functions performance reliability: a) period  is 
strict deterministic and equals to Treq. (discrete distribution V(t)); b) V(t)=1-exp(-t/Treq.) when 
period  is exponential distributed (i.e. one is variable) and its mean is equal to Treq ; c) 
W(t)=1-exp(-t/Trep.). Input: n is the conditional number of a subsystem; k is the conditional 
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number of a unit; TMTBF nk is the mean time between hardware/software failures for the k-
th unit of the n-th subsystem;Trep. is the mean time of system repair after any unit failure. 
Customer requirements: Treq. is the mean required period of permanent IS operation when 
reliability should be provided; Рadm. is the admissible probability of providing reliable 
functions performance by IS during the required time Treq.. 
With the subsystem “Reliability” of CEISOQ+ the next reliability metrics may be evaluated: 
TMTBF n – the mean time between failures of the n-th subsystem in an active redundancy 
mode; TMTBF 1..n - is the mean time between failures of a complex composed of 1, 2,…, n 
subsystems, each of which can perform its functions both in active and passive redundancy 
modes; Prel n – is the probability of reliable n-th subsystem functions performance during the 
period Treq. both in active and passive redundancy modes; Prel 1..n - is the probability of 
reliable functions performance by a complex composed of 1, 2,…, n subsystems during the 
time Treq. when redundant elements are used both in active and passive redundancy modes; 
Prel – is the probability of reliable functions performance during the time Treq. when 
redundant elements are used both in active and passive redundancy modes, Prel = Prel 1..N , 
where N – is the number of subsystems in the modeled system; Kavail. – is the system 
availability when redundant elements are used both in active and passive redundancy 
modes, 
.
. . .
0
( )lim
req
avail rel req
Т
K P Т , i.e. if to set very small Treq. (for example 1 millisecond) the 
evaluated value Prel approximates Kavail.. 
3.3. Timeliness of information producing  
Data circulated in a system, resources spent by process performer, queries for operator 
processing, output as a result of input flows for transforming into outputs may be formally 
calls for processing in a queue system. To estimate timeliness of required calls processing by 
process architectures let’s examine existing approaches to their formalization. According to 
researches various methods of the queuing theory provide rather high degree of adequacy 
for calls processing modelling. There may be quite a few processing technologies: priority 
and unpriority processing by one or several servers, multiphase processing, time-sharing 
processing etc. Now there are some methodical approaches to estimation of some 
technologies under various conditions including the ones to analysis of computing systems 
and networks. As applied to queueing systems the term “processing technology” means the 
same with the term “processing mode, order or discipline”, determining an order of call 
selection from a queue buffer for further processing. For example in accordance to 
information systems these calls are not only the ones on receiving of output documents but 
also on files transfer or information entering into a database, as well as technological calls on 
control of a computing process, access administration, information security providing.  
It is proposed to formalize processes of users’ information servicing as processing of Poisson 
flows by reliable singleserver or multiserver queuing system with a buffer of an infinite size. 
In practice process architectures for calls processing are formalized often as processing of 
Poisson calls flows by single-server or multi-server queuing system with a buffer of an 
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infinite size. A supposition concerning Poisson calls flows may be substantiated by the fact 
that among Palma type flows a Poisson flow puts the queuing system in the most hard 
conditions and for queuing time metrics gives upper estimations. Moreover, calls flows of 
the same type as a rule constitute a compound flow from different sources. In practice, each 
flow intensity is very low in comparison with the compound flow. In such a situation 
theorem (Grigolionis (1963)) is applicable, according to which the compound flow is a 
Poisson flow. All the cited considerations as well as statistical researches results prove a 
possibility of assumption concerning Poisson calls flows. On the analogy with this a 
supposition concerning an exponential law of calls processing time distribution also allows 
to get pessimistic estimation of system response time. 
There are several approaches to an analytical estimation of calls processing timeliness in 
queuing systems. The simplest is the one allowing a distribution function of system 
response on a call. It is necessary to note that an explicit distribution function may be got 
only for simplest systems without priorities, for example, for system М/М/1/ (Gnedenko 
(1973)). There is another approach to estimation of systems for which distribution functions 
of system response time are expressed in terms of various Laplace-Stielies transformations 
(Gnedenko (1973)). For the wide range of priority systems М/G/1/ with different 
processing technologies time-probabilistic characteristics are drawn in such a form. The 
expressions of joint distribution of a queue length and waiting queue time are drawn in the 
form of a functional dependency in terms of various Laplace-Stielties transformations and 
productive (generating) functions. They give an idea of mathematical complexity of models. 
In this case the desired probability may be computed on the basis of invert Laplace-Stielties 
transformations. Though there are some applied ways of such invert transformations 
practical computations require not only additional programming on a high level but also 
essential time expenses. Such conditions complicate a work of a system analyst. That’s why 
in practice there often used approaches providing approximate estimations of the desired 
probability. The most popular way of approximate estimation consists in an approximation 
of a response distribution function with the help of the incomplete gamma-function. 
J.Martin’s studies of some priority processing technologies proved rather high engineering 
accuracy of such an approximation (Martin (1972)). This approach is used by the CEISOQ+. 
A supposition concerning infinite number of queuing buffer in practice means allotment for 
storage of calls, input and output data such system memory sizes that guarantee in case of 
right system use absence of information losses caused by possible buffer’s overflow. Though 
last years we can trace a stable tendency of main storage and external storage memory size 
expansion together with its price reduction. Problems with lack of memory for information 
systems appear more seldom and it seems they won’t cause any troubles in the nearest 
future. Taking into account all the abovementioned the supposition concerning infinite 
number of queuing buffer seems to be acceptable for many cases.  
The core of formalization is: modelling by means of priority and unpriority queuing systems 
М/G/1/ is possible (Gnedenko (1973); Kleinrock (1976), Matweev & Ushakov (1984) etc.). 
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The offered models and software tools CEISOQ+ allow to estimate and to compare 
effectiveness of the next dispatcher technologies:  
- technology 1 for apriority calls processing: in a consecutive order for single-tasking 
processing mode (regime ”Singletasking”); in a time-sharing order for multitasking 
processing mode (regime ”Multitasking”); 
- priority technologies of consecutive calls processing 2-5: 
- technology 2 for calls processing with relative priorities in the order “first in - first out” 
FIFO; 
- technology 3 for calls processing with absolute priorities in the order FIFO; 
- technology 4 for batch calls processing (with relative priorities and in the order FIFO 
inside a batch) (Kostogryzov (1987)); 
- technology 5 is a combination of technologies 2, 3, 4 see (Kostogryzov (1987, 1992)). 
In case of technology 1, single-tasking processing mode allows to process calls in the 
consecutive order FIFO. In case of multitasking processing mode if there are n calls they are 
all processed simultaneously but each call is processed n times as slower as it had been 
processed alone in the system. According to technology 2 calls with higher priority are 
processed earlier. If calls are of the same priority they are processed in the consecutive 
order. There is no interruption of begun call processing by another call of higher priority 
appeared. Unlike technology 2, technology 3 allows an interruption of processing if a 
priority of the coming call is higher than a priority of the processed call. Processing of 
interrupted calls continues from the interrupted place. In the case of technology 4, the first 
call, coming to an off-line system, forms the first batch. The next batch is formed by calls, 
which come during the previous batch processing time, and is processed immediately after 
all the calls of previous batch have been processed. In the processed batch all calls are 
processed according to technology 2 with the exception that the processing cannot be 
interrupted. Finally, for technology 5, all calls are divided into n groups. Calls of the g-th 
group have higher priority than calls of the e-th group if g<e (e, g = 1,…, n). Calls of one 
group have their own relative priorities that are actual only within this group. 
Estimation of system operation time-probabilistic characteristics may be made with the help 
of the CEISOQ+ subsystem “TIMELINESS” (Kostogryzov et al. (2000-2002)). The models use 
allows to choose between the calls timeliness criterions: the mean processing time criterion 
1; the probability criterion 2 of well-timed processing. 
Criterion 1. An output information of the i–th type is considered to be well-timed according 
to the criterion of calls mean processing time if response time Tfull i is no less than required 
admissible time ௥ܶ௘௤.௜: ௙ܶ௨௟௟	௜ ≤	 ௥ܶ௘௤.௜  
Criterion 2. An output information of the i–th type is considered to be well-timed according 
to the probabilistic criterion if Ptim.i =P(tfull i  Treq.i.) Preq.i , where tfull i is the processing time, 
including queueing time and run time, Tfull i is the mean response time.  
Note. The CEISOQ+ use proved the revealed analytical regularity for Technology 4: ratio of 
mean waiting time in a calls queue of low priority to mean waiting time of high priority 
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calls doesn’t exceed 3 units no matter what the system throughput is. At the same time for 
Technologies 2 and 3 this ratio may be measured in dozens or hundreds (other things being 
equal it is much greater for Technology 3 than for Technology 2). This very regularity is 
used for increasing the processing effectiveness owing to a combination of Technologies 2, 3 
and 4 (see Technology 5). 
The CEISOQ+ subsystem “TIMELINESS” use allows to estimate the next metrics: the mean 
wait time in a queue Tqueue i; the mean processing time, including the wait time (it names also 
the mean response time) Tfull i; the probability of well-timed processing during the required 
term Treq.r (Ptim.i); the relative portion of all well-timed processed calls (S); the relative portion 
of well-timed processed calls of those types for which the customer requirements are met 
(C). For all technologies the probability function of well-timed calls processing is 
approximated by incomplete gamma-distribution: 
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a1=(there is used criterion 1 and Tfull i£Treq. i); a2=(there is used criterion 2 and ௧ܲ௜௠.௜ ≥ ௥ܲ௘௤.௜. 
3.4. Completeness of output information   
A system will work in user’s interest only after necessary initial input data concerning 
objects of its application domain have been entered. In the operational process there may be 
entered 2 types of current information sources:  
- information concerning new objects which is firstly entered into a system; 
- information concerning objects, which has already been stored in a system and is 
purposed for updating.  
From the moment of information of the 1st appearance till the moment of its entering into a 
system is considered as incomplete as respects this information. In reality this information 
exists, characterizes states of new objects, which must be registered by system, but is not 
reflected in the system and therefore can’t be taken into account by a system because he 
doesn’t know about it. Concerning this information we may speak about its completeness 
only after its operational representation in system, after which a formal state of 
incompleteness disappears. Estimation of completeness level may be carried out with the 
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help of the model of entering into system current data concerning new objects of application 
domain (below described), the CEISOQ+ subsystem “Completeness”.  
For both types of information the next question is reasonable: how actual is the information 
represented in the system at the moment of its use? The answer may be found in the next 
subchapter 3.5, where the models complex of information gathering from sources and the 
subsystem “Actuality” of the CEISOQ+ are used. In this chapter we pay attention to 
modelling process architectures for providing completeness of entering into system current 
data concerning new objects of application domain, i.e. of the first type of information. It is 
important to note that a theoretical solution of applied analysis and synthesis problems does 
not mean simplicity of its practical implementation. Though problems of data transfer and 
input into a system present no difficulties, problems of required information gathering and 
identification are still a stumbling block. As a result many systems are obliged to operate in 
conditions of information incompleteness because a scientific conception of required 
information gathering system characteristics does not provide practical possibilities of its 
implementation. 
An analysis of system operation reveals that solving some problems it is often necessary to 
account a variety of objects and events, which occurrence is of a stochastic character. There 
may be considered some tasks of airport system, aircraft global positioning receiver system, 
tasks of reconnaissance, tracking of an area state in conditions of radioactive contamination, 
loads accounting by the customs etc. we shall consider output information complete if it 
represents all real objects and events necessary for system staff to perform their functions. In 
an automatic control system there is always represented only complete output information. 
All information circulating in an automatic control system is strictly determined and 
processed automatically, i.e. occurrence of new objects influencing on technological 
operations is eliminated. And vice versa any system is always operating in information 
incompleteness according to terrorist threats conditions. At the same time, we’ll distinguish 
completeness and validity of represented information: the completeness concerns only that 
objects which appear, and validity concerns both new and stored information. In 
consequence, information may be complete, but not actual. 
The essence of information incompleteness influence on decision-making consists in the 
impossibility of registration of all objects and events (OE), describing formal state of reality 
and influencing on decisions. As a logic result of decision-making may turn out to be 
inadequate to the situation, i.e. a decision turns out to be incorrect. A system contains 
information about states of all real objects and coincides if the number of occupied server for 
system M/G/ is equal to zero.  
Let's assume that appearance of new objects or events essential for a solution of a specific 
task occurs at random moments (we shall call them “causing”). Periods between these 
moments are also random, their duration is distributed by the exponential law with the 
parameter l. In a causing moment with the probability qm there appear m new objects and 
events 
m
m
1q  . A generating function of appearing objects and events number at a 
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causing moment we shall notate as Ф(z). In practice appearance of several objects and events 
is explained by their common origin: for example, as a result of a catastrophe on a chemical 
plant appears a set of zones of ecological contamination. After their appearance there is 
organized a message preparing during mean time wI with a distribution function В1(t). Then 
the message is transferred for its loading into an IS during mean time di with a distribution 
function В2(t). There may be a delay in receiving of the message (for example, for a visual 
check of the data), then the message is loaded into an is within bi with a distribution 
function B3(t). Thus, the loaded information allows to use classic results for queuing systems 
with an infinite number of servers ܯ/ܩ/∞.  
The probability that IS contains information about states of all real object and coincides with 
the probability that number of occupied server for system ܯ/ܩ/∞ is equal to zero. It mails 
calculated by formula (Matweev & Ushakov (1984)). If with the probability qm m new objects 
appear in random intervals exponentially distributed with parameter l, then the found 
probability:  
  .
0
1 ( )  ,comp exp t dtP 
             (2) 
where 
0
( )  
m
m
m
z q z
    -is productive (generating) function; В(t) – is the PDF of time for 
new information revealing and preparing B1(t), transfer B2(t) and entering into IS B3(t). 
B(t)=B1*B2*B3(t). 
The next variants are used by the CEISOQ+: Ф(z)=z; B(t) is exponentially distributed. 
The final clear analytical formulas for modelling are received by integration (2) expression. 
With the subsystem “Completeness” of the CEISOQ+ use the probability that IS contains 
information about states of all real object and coincides may be estimated. 
3.5. Actuality of input information from using point of view  
After information has been entered into a system it gains a property of actuality. It is clear 
that for real systems output information is received after it has been structured, formally 
processed and mixed with other information, which is gathered from different sources and 
is characterized by different significant state changes frequency of considered objects. 
Output information is a “mixture” of various input data elements with different actuality. 
As an analogue to actuality there may be product freshness by the moment of cooking. For 
example fresh fish has its useful life (a period between significant changes of consumer 
properties) equal to several hours, fruits life equals to several days, wine’s – several years. 
Output information is also a product to be used by a man, that is why it should be “fresh” 
(in our terms – actual) for problems solving. As a stale ingredient spoils all food a non-actual 
part of output information may spoil information quality. The same information may be 
actual for solving one problem and non-actual for another one.  
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IS users usually use "anonymous" output documents received as a result of their calls 
processing by a computer. It would be ideal an output document were marked by the date 
by which the values included in it would have been actual. It would be completely similar 
with sold food on packages of which there are indicated its expiry date. However, in a 
reality it is wide from the truth. In practice the objects state changes are entered into an IS 
with some delay and for the different data delays are different. Moreover, the same 
information may be actual for a solution of one problem and turn out to be completely 
irrelevant for another one. In other words, in an output document under a date of its 
creation data of a different actuality degree may be represented. Thus, for problem solving 
there is used output information different from the real one because of its changes in the 
course of time. If this difference is essential, use of such information may cause errors. 
Therefore, substantiating engineering solutions of providing an actual condition of used 
information an engineer has to solve a problem of quantitative estimation of achieved 
actuality for different technologies of information gathering and bringing it to the notice of 
users.  
Without any limitation we consider process architectures for items gathering on the 
examples of providing information actuality. According the offered below models complex 
of information gathering from sources the next statement for evaluation information 
actuality is proposed.  
Statement 2. The limited probability of information actuality on the moment of its use exists 
under conditions of existence for stationary probability distribution for considered 
characteristics and their independence.  
One is equal to: 
a. for the mode D1 when information is gathered in order “immediately after an essential 
object state change: 
 
 1 B(t)[1 C(t)]dt,Pact
0ξ
   (3) 
b. for the mode D2 when information is gathered without any dependencies on changes of 
objects current states (including regulated information gathering) 
 
1
[1 Q(t)][1 C(t τ)dB(τ)] dt,Pact. 00q
       
   (4) 
where C(t) is the PDF of time between essential changes of object states, ߦ  – is the mean 
time; B(t) is the PDF of time for information gathering and preparing B1(t), transfer B2(t) and 
entering into IS B3(t); B(t)=B1*B2*B3(t); Q(t) is the PDF of time interval between information 
updating, q is the mean time (only for mode D2). 
The final clear analytical formulas for modelling are received by Lebesque-integration of (3) 
and (4) expressions. 
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Introduction of admissible limits of item suitable values changes is connected with a concept 
of an essential change of real characteristics of objects and events. We’ll call a change of an 
object’s characteristic essential for a solution of a certain problem, if well-timed 
representation of faultless information about this change to a user influences logic or result 
of the solution. Fully similar situation is peculiar not only to information process 
architectures but also to many other gathered items (inputs, system elements or components 
for a project in life cycle, required products or system operation outputs for an user, for 
instance, information, etc.).  
With the subsystem “Actuality” of the CEISOQ+ use the probability of information actuality 
on the moment of its use may be estimated. 
3.6. Information foultlessness after checking  
Problems of item content analysis are everywhere in system life cycle. It may be 
nondestructive defects control for some objects safety checking, documentation or drawings 
checking, hardware or software testing against potential errors, information analysis for 
making decision etc. In any case there exist some objects, may be latent or suspicious for 
revealing and their following analysis. It is clear that more often item content analysis 
quality depends on system’s application domain and used analysis methods. In a general 
case methods of analysis and decision-making may contain elements of both creative work 
and guessing. Nonetheless, any analysis is based on logical positions. Logic implies 
argumentation based on essential information use. The way of logical information use is an 
algorithm of given information analysis. In practice this algorithm is implemented by either 
a man or an applied software. Both of them we shall mean under the term “analyst”. The 
cited sequence of positions concerning logicality of item analysis algorithm allowed us to 
formalize a process architectures for item content analysis according to the offered model. 
To apply this concept to information architectures, let’s assume that in a system there are 
provided gathered information completeness and actuality and there is confidence in 
software/hardware tools correct operation. Is it enough for providing validity of output 
information? No, it is far from being enough. The person, from his/her date of birth, lives in 
conditions of information incompleteness, that is why modern IS are oriented on all possible 
ways of gathering complete information. One of the modern IS advantages is that they are 
developed to solve principal problems of information actuality owing to quick consumers 
informing. If it is not possible to use “the freshest” information then a man may use less 
fresh information to estimate the current and predict future states of considered objects. 
Incompleteness and non-actuality of information are the unavoidable properties of natural 
human environment. The main danger is in insufficient effectiveness of information 
gathering.  
The problem concerning information faultlessness is completely different. In practice it is 
very difficult to provide information faultlessness. The fact lies not only in technological 
complexity but also in the term “error” and in man’s physical inability of not making errors. 
So let’s review the term “error” and the term “distortion” which is close to the first one. 
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Despite seeming simplicity these terms concerning information circulating in an IS are not 
fully the same. A syntax error in spelling, which does not influence sense of input or output 
documents, does not have a deteriorative influence upon information validity. Moreover, if 
quantitative deviation of considered objects characteristics is considered significant if it is 
more than 10% (for instance) an appeared deviation in parts of percent cannot be 
characterized as an error. It is only degree of information correctness, which is taken into 
account by those who make decisions. From the other hand the term “to distort” is 
interpreted as “to show smth in the false color”. The term “distortion” itself means 
inadmissibility of further use. Below we shall use the term “error” for accidental data 
deviations. In cases implying premeditation we shall use the term “distortion”. To define 
these terms for IS let’s assume that information gathering and processing is carried out 
instantly and during storage before its use accounted objects do not change their states (if 
they change them the information is instantly updated). Then under an information error or 
distortion in such idealized IS we mean such data changes which in case of correct 
information processing may cause paralysis and/or changes in results of system operation. 
Thus use of these terms we shall connect with information quality inadmissibility for its 
further efficient use. In fact data updating does not happen instantly but after a certain 
period of information transferring. In this case to errors and distortions are added non-
actuality and other natural and artificial influences deteriorating information quality.  
This subchapter is dedicated to studying faultlessness estimated with the help of the next 
model of items analysis. The core of modelling is illustrated by Figure 8 (for information 
checking application domain). 
 
 
 
 
 
 - the error is being in checking information;  - detected and corrected error;  
              - a minimum of two characteristics: 
а) continuous work time of a checker (after with there should be following recovery time); 
b) checking run time, depending on checked information contain and checking speed; 
- assigned term (deadline) for checking; 
- minimum of two characteristics: 
а) t ime between type II check errors (when existing errors were missed); 
b) assigned term (deadline) for checking; 
- t ime between type I check errors (when true information interpreted as false) 
…                              …
  
           
…          …
     
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t 
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Figure 8. The illustration of processes for information analysis  
On an example for visual checking, the cases 1, 2, 3 characterize presence if only of one 
errors, the cases 4, 5 and any other characterize that faultlessness after checking is provided.  
It is not always possible in practice to draw a logical bound for admissible deviations. Often 
even an insignificant deviation may become important for system functions performance. At 
the same time it is undisputable that required data faultlessness should be set taking into 
consideration effects of system operation, damage caused by errors and also errors 
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preventing and negative consequences elimination expenses. If to put an end to the above 
mentioned it turns out that for a user understanding of an “error” depends on information 
purpose and methods of its processing. Information processing implies: syntax and 
semantic information control to detect and eliminate errors; various processes 
(generalization, arithmetical and logical operations etc.) and as a final result – pragmatic 
information filtering and analysis and logical making decision with the purpose of its 
further use. 
In real systems we always have to solve a problem of a balance between input information 
content and quality of its processing within the assigned period. If an input information 
content is big the number of errors increases what may cause a control action time waste. To 
be on schedule it is necessary to optimize the information content and to develop more 
rational information processing and representing technologies.  
The model is used for evaluation of information foultlessness after checking and 
information processing correctness. 
Definition 1. Information after checking is considered as faultless if all data errors were 
detected and corrected and no new errors were made. Definition 2. Information processing is 
considered as correct analysis if all essential information was faultless analyzed and no 
algorithmic errors was made. 
There are possible the four variants of correlations between the characteristics.  
Variant 1. An assigned term for analysis is no less than the real analysis time ( ௥ܶ௘௔௟ ≤	 ௥ܶ௘௤.) 
and the content of analyzed information is such small that it is required only one continuous 
analyst’s work period ( ௥ܶ௘௔௟ ≤	 ௖ܶ௢௡௧.).  
There is proposed the next Statement 3. 
Statement 3. Under the condition of independence for considered characteristics the 
probability of information faultlessness (for problems of checking) or processing correctness 
(for problems of analysis) during the required term is equal to: 
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where N(t) is the PDF of time between type I analysis errors, -1 is the mean time, for 
example, N(t) = 1 –exp(-t×); M(t) is the PDF of time between the neighboring errors in 
checked information, for example M(t) = 1 –exp(-t××); А(t) is the PDF of analyzed type II 
errors, TMTBF is the mean time;  is the relative fraction of errors in information content 
(destined for problems of checking) or the relative fraction of information essential for 
analysis (destined for problems of analysis); Treal= V/ - is the real time for complete 
information analysis; V – is a content of analyzed information;  - is an analyzed speed; Tcont. 
- is time of continuous analyst’s work; Treq. - is an assigned term (deadline) for analysis.  
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V, , Tcont. and Treq. are assigned as deterministic values. The probability that there are not 
errors without checking is Рno(V) = e-µV . 
The final clear analytical formulas for modelling are received by Lebesque-integration of (5) 
expression. 
Variant 2. An assigned term for analysis is no less than the real analysis time (i.e. ௥ܶ௘௔௟ ≤௥ܶ௘௤.). But the content of analyzed information is comparatively large, i.e. Treal>Tcont..  
Statement 4. Under the condition of independence for considered characteristics the 
probability of information faultlessness (for problems of checking) or processing correctness 
(for problems of analysis) during the required term may be estimated by following: 
           .2  1  2 2, , , , , , ,NMTBF contafter after part partР Р V n Т Т  (6) 
where ܰ = ܸ/(	Т௖௢௡௧.), ௣ܸ௔௥௧(ଶ) = ܸ/ܰ, ߬௣௔௥௧(ଶ) 	= 	Т௥௘௤./ܰ. 
Variant 3. An assigned term for analysis is less than the real analysis time (Treal>Treq.) and the 
content of analyzed information is such small that it is required only one continuous 
analyst’s work period (ܶݎ݈݁ܽ	 ≤ 	ܶܿ݋݊ݐ. ).. 
Statement 5. Under the condition of independence of considered characteristics the 
probability of information faultlessness (for problems of checking) or processing correctness 
(for problems of analysis) during the required term may be estimated by following: 
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where       3 .3   ,   .partV Vreq withoutpartV Т Р e ‐  
Variant 4. An assigned term for analysis is no less than the real analysis time (i.e. Treal>Treq.). 
But the content of analyzed information is comparatively large, i.e. Treal>Tcont.. 
Statement 6. Under the condition of independence of considered characteristics the 
probability of information faultlessness (for problems of checking) or processing correctness 
(for problems of analysis) during the required term may be estimated by following: 
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where             
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The fraction of errors in information after checking equals to    1after afterР‐ . 
The final clear analytical formulas for modelling are received by integration (5) and using 
(6)-(8). 
With the subsystem “Effectiveness of checking” of CEISOQ+ use the probability of errors 
absence after checking and the fraction of errors in information after checking may be 
estimated. 
3.7. Correctness of information processing   
The mathematical model of items analysis (subchapter 3.6) is recommended to be used also 
for estimating correctness of information processing. With the subsystem “Correctness of 
processing” of the CEISOQ+ the probability of correct analysis results obtaining may be 
estimated. 
3.8. Faultless operation of staff and users   
A man is an unavoidable element of an IS as its user and staff, providing system’s 
functionality. How does this element influence achievement of system operation purposes? 
To answer this question the CEISOQ+ subsystem “Faultlessness man’s actions” may be 
used. As the subsystem is completely analogous to the subsystem “RELIABILITY” (see 
subchapter 3.2) we’ll use the minimum problem definitions and illustrating examples. The 
next metrics may be estimated: the mean time between errors for a complex composed of 
functional groups; the probability faultless operation of a complex composed of functional 
groups 1,…,n during the period Treq. 
3.9. Protection against dangerous influences   
Nowadays at system development and utilization an essential part of funds is spent on 
providing system protection from various dangerous influences able to violate system 
integrity including information integrity. Under information integrity we mean such 
information state which provides the required operation quality of a used IS. 
Such dangerous influences on IS are program defects events, virus influences, influences of 
software bugs, violators’ influences, terrorists attacks (in the information field), 
psychological influences on men by means of ordered radio and TV programs etc. 
There are examined two technologies of providing protection from dangerous influences: 
proactive diagnostic of system integrity (technology 1) and security monitoring when 
system integrity is checked at every shift change of operators (technology 2). 
Technology 1 is based on proactive diagnostics of system integrity. Diagnostics are carried 
out periodically. It is assumed that except diagnostics means there are also included means 
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of necessary integrity recovery after revealing of danger sources penetration into a system or 
consequences of negative influences. Integrity violations detecting is possible only as a 
result of diagnostics, after which system recovery is started. Dangerous influences on 
system are acted step-by step: at first a danger source penetrates into a system and then after 
its activation begins to influence. System integrity is not considered to be violated before a 
penetrated danger source is activated. A danger is considered to be realized only after a 
danger source has influenced on a system. If to compare an IS with a man technology 1 
reminds a periodical diagnostics of a man’s health state. If diagnostics results have revealed 
symptoms of health worsening a man is cured (integrity is recovered). Between diagnostics 
an infection penetrated into a man’s body brings a man into an unhealthy state (a dangerous 
influence is realized). The essence of protecting process architecture for the first technology 
is illustrated by Figure 9. The cases 1, 4 illustrate dangerous influences. The cases 2, 3, 5 
illustrate secure system operation during a period Treq. 
Note. It is supposed that used diagnostic tools allow to provide necessary system integrity 
recovery after revealing of danger sources penetration into a system or consequences of 
negative influences. 
 
 
 
 
 - time between the neighboring diagnostics 
 
- a required period Treq  of permanent secure operation 
 
- as minimum, there is tw o diagnostics during a required period Treq (the illustration 
of  Treq  middle) 
 
- a required period Treq  has ended after the last diagnostic 
 
- a dander source has penetrated before the next diagnostic  
 
- a dander source has not penetrated into system 
 
- a penetrated dander source has activated before the next diagnostic 
 
- a penetrated dander source has not activated before the next diagnostic  
t
Cases:         1               2               3                    4                             5              
… … 
 
Figure 9. The illustration of processes for protecting system resources against dangerous influences by 
technology 1 
Technology 2, unlike the previous one, implies that operators alternating each other trace 
system integrity between diagnostics. In case of detecting a danger source an operator is 
supposed to remove it recovering system integrity (ways of danger sources removing are 
analogous to the ways of technology 1. A penetration of a danger source into a system and 
its activation is possible only if an operator makes an error. Faultless operator’s actions 
provide a neutralization of a danger source trying to penetrate into a system. When 
operators alternate a complex diagnostics is held. A penetration of a danger source is 
possible only if an operator makes an error but a dangerous influence occurs if the danger is 
activated before the next diagnostic. Otherwise the source will be detected and neutralized. 
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Thus in comparison with a man technology 2 reminds a continuous staying in a hospital 
when between rare diagnostics a patient is permanently under medical observation of 
operator. A dangerous infection penetrates into a man’s body only because of a doctor’s 
fault while it may be discovered later as a result of either an exacerbation of a latent illness 
or the next diagnostic.  
For all technologies availability of means of danger sources total-lot detecting and existence 
of ways of violated system integrity total-lot recovery may seem to be a very high 
requirement. Nonetheless, a system which can’t check and recover its integrity is a very 
vulnerable and knowingly doomed system. 
With the subsystem “Protection from dangerous influences” of CEISOQ+ the probability of 
secure system operation within the assigned period may be estimated as a result of use the 
next mathematical models.  
There are possible the next variants for technology 1: variant 1 – the assigned period Treq is 
less than established period between neighboring diagnostics (Treq < Tbetw.+Tdiag); variant 2 – 
the assigned period Treq is more than or equals to established period between neighboring 
diagnostics   . .req betw diagT T T . Here Tbetw. – is the time between the end of diagnostic and 
the beginning of the next diagnostic, Tdiag – is the diagnostic time. 
Statement 7. Under the condition of independence of considered characteristics the 
probability of dangerous influence absence for variant 1 is equal to 
        . 1  1  * ,req penetr activ reqinflP T T‐   (9) 
where ߗ penetr(t) – is the PDF of time between neighboring influences for penetrating a danger 
source, for example ߗ penetr(t) = 1-e-st, s - is the frequency of influences for penetrating; ߗ activ(t) 
– is the PDF of activation time of a penetrated danger source, for	example	ߗ activ(t)=1-e-t/b, b – is 
the mean activation time; Treq – is the required period of permanent secure system operation.  
Statement 8. Under the condition of independence for considered characteristics the 
probability of dangerous influence absence for variant 2 is equal to 
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where N=[ Treq. /(Tbetw +Tdiag)] – is the integer part, the remainder time Trmn = Treq-N(Tbetw +Tdiag). 
Statement 9. Under the condition of independence for considered characteristics the 
probability of dangerous influence absence for variant 1 is equal to 
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Here penetr(t) – is the PDF of time between neighboring influences for penetrating a danger 
source, penetr.(t)=1-e-st, s - is the frequency of influences for penetrating; activ(t) – is the PDF of 
activation time of a penetrated danger source, activ(t)=1-e-t/b, b – is the mean activation time; 
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Tbetw. – is the time between the end of diagnostic and the beginning of the next diagnostic 
(Tbetw.=const); A(t) is the PDF of time between operator’s error, TMTBF is the mean time, A(t)=1-
exp(-t/TMTBF). Tdiag – is the diagnostic time (Tdiag.=const); Treq – is the required period of 
permanent secure system operation. 
Statement 10. Under the condition of independence of considered characteristics the 
probability of dangerous influence absence for variant 2 is equal to 
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Pwholly – is the probability of dangerous influence absence within the assigned period Treq.: 
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and Pinfl.(1)(T) is defined above, but one is calculated not for all period Treq, only for the 
remainder time Trmn = Treq-N(Tbetw +Tdiag).  
The final clear analytical formulas for modelling by the CEISOQ+ are received after 
Lebesque-integration of (11), (13) expressions with due regard to Statements (7)-(10). 
3.10. Protection from an unauthorized access   
At all times a particular attention was paid to the problem of effective system resources 
(facilities, valuables, information, software etc.) protection from an unauthorized access 
(UAA). None clever solutions didn’t guarantee complete protection from UAA to complex 
systems. As we have made sure there is also impossible to provide total-lot system 
reliability, information timeliness, actuality, faultlessness, correctness, and system protection 
from dangerous influences. Now we shall pay some attention to common regulations of 
providing protection from UAA in applications to IS.  
Results of UAA may be the next: a dangerous influence on a secure system operation(on a 
subsystem of access control, a subsystem of account, a subsystem of integrity providing); a 
physical influence on system items (destroying, power supply failures, interceptions of 
electromagnetic radiation); an unauthorized withdrawing, acquaintance, use or dangerous 
influences on stored, processed, transferred and represented information (theft, fraud, 
insertion of spurious information, deleting, i.e. any violation of information integrity); an 
unauthorized use or change of system content, structure and functionality (including 
changes of configuration parameters, an introduction of bugs, viruses); hardware/software 
failures and malfunction; violating of network interconnection etc. 
It should be formulated system security policy. The protected batch should create a virtual 
system operation environment, model potential threats, reveal vulnerabilities of a system, 
estimate potential risks and damage, compare expenses on the whole system operation and 
the subsystem of providing IS security. However we should remember that security 
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provision mustn’t hinder from real objectives achievement for the sake of which these 
systems are created.  
To understand ways of overcoming protective barriers by a violator it is worth citing some 
examples of bottlenecks in existing information security systems: 
- authenticating users a security service doesn’t always have an ability to make sure of a 
user’s authenticity. The particular ways of authentication (on the basis of a fingerprint 
or an eye retina analysis) have not been widely distributed yet;  
- access delimitation to computer resources is not insuperable. The majority of systems 
does not support a mandatory access control, a cryptography information protection is 
not always introduced (sometimes such disregard of a cryptography information 
protection is justified if to take into account a required IS throughput but in other cases 
it is unjustified), a password access to the most relevant resources is not executed etc.; 
- many protective systems do not prevent an unauthorized start of executable software 
files including a remote start of access procedures to resources of other computers; 
- protection from viruses and bugs is still problematical (see the examples of this 
chapter); 
- speed of crypto-transformations is not high enough, what often causes users’ refusals of 
encoding; 
- a control of a protection system operation correctness is quite often ignored, signaling 
functions are not performed; 
- a required security of a network transfer is not provided (authenticity, capabilities of 
interception, insertion of spurious message are not checked and there is no keys 
distribution between network nodes); 
- functions of substantiated information redundancy are often not realized. For example, 
a used background redundancy does not provide an information recovery owing to 
both failures of soft/hardware means and unauthorized actions; 
- there are possible errors of network administrator (configuration, access to network 
resources and recovery control) and in control of a protection system operation 
correctness; 
- weaknesses of used a cryptographic algorithms (absence of short and trivial passwords 
check, use of secret functions of overcoming cryptographic protection etc.); 
- unfounded periodicity and order of tuned parameters changes (identifiers and 
authorities of the users, passwords and key information, frequency of resources 
integrity control etc); 
- failures to meet requirements to the protocol of information intercommunication, 
correctness and completeness (there are possible interception of the transferred data, 
their thefts, changes and readdressing, unauthorized mailing on behalf of another user, 
a denial of data authenticity, etc). For example, an interception is possible if a violator 
synthetically connects to an unauthorized router network with readdressing of a 
messages flow; 
- an IS elements malfunction (failures or an essential slowdown of executed operations), 
which can be as a result of a network overload, critical data deleting and performance 
of critical functions etc. 
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Thus the above-mentioned positions of information protection and overcoming of protective 
measures are to promote a better understanding of process architectures for protecting 
system resources from an UAA.  
If to represent such a system from the point of view of its operation logics the process 
architecture for system resource protection is a complex of sequential obstacle barriers. A 
user is taught how to overcome these barriers to get an access to resources. A violator has to 
overcome these barriers trying to find system vulnerabilities (see Figure 10). A security 
service controls system operation thus reducing system vulnerability. 
A probabilistic space for estimating of influences absence after UAA is created in the 
supposition that in a system there are realized protective measures from a potential violator. 
To get access to resources stored in a system there is a set of barriers known to an authorized 
user. A violator is a tool or person who does or doesn’t know how protective barriers work. 
Somehow breaking an algorithm of barriers overcoming a violator may easily get access to 
system resources. We examine the most difficult mode of security system operation in 
conditions of the constant threat of its breaking. A violator is able to penetrate into a system 
only if: 1) he finds out how that part of the protection system works which is needed for 
his/her purposes achievement; 2) he gets access to information and/or software resources 
before this protective system will be changed (in this case the violator will have to overcome 
the new barriers). In modelling actions of "clever" violator equipped with high-tech means 
of system breaking are described by a greater speed of barriers overcoming. 
The formalized process architectures for protecting system resources is fair for security 
estimating without and with considering objective period when resources value is high (see 
Figure 10b)). Often in practice this period is essentially limited. As an Air Transport System 
example there may be information resources used for performance of one passenger 
transportation or a certain task. After the task fulfillment the objective value of these 
resources comes to zero (is actual only archive value). The second example concerns a flight 
control system of an aircraft which operating lever are located in a cockpit. From the point 
of view of a flight security in conditions of terrorist threats a period of objective value of 
these resources coincides with a flight time or if an airplane is high-jacked it coincides with 
the period of its capture. As the third example there may be cash financial or gold-value 
resources in a bank after their receipt for storage. In this case from the point of view of the 
bank’s security system the period of objective value of resources coincides with the period of 
their keeping in depositories of bank.  
As a rule information has a certain period of its objective value (POV), which influences on 
the system protection from UAA. In the offered subchapter on the basis of use the model of 
unauthorized access to system resources taking into account POV of information resources, 
there is estimated confidentiality of used information. Estimations are based on a use of the 
CEISOQ+ subsystem “CONFIDENTIALITY”. Thus the period of objective information 
confidentiality in a system is POV concerning information resources.  
Thus, a period of objective value (POV) of a resource is time appropriate for the resource 
after expiring of which the resource loses its value and objectively does not need any 
protection from UAA. For the present model taking into account POV resources are 
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considered to be protected from UAA if as a result of UAA after their POV has finished 
there is no penetration to them. The core of more general process architecture with due 
regard to resources value for one barrier is illustrated by Figure 10b)). Unauthorized access 
during objective period, when resources value is high, went through barrier in cases 1 and 4. 
Resources are protected in other cases 2,3,5. 
With the subsystem “Protection from unauthorized access” of CEISOQ+ the probability of 
providing system protection from UAA by means of barriers 1st, 2nd..., mth and by means of 
all barriers may be estimated as a result of use the next mathematical model. 
 
 
Figure 10. The illustration of processes for protecting system in application to a) UAA and b) 
information confidentially for an one barrier 
As the model without considering objective period when resources value is high there is 
proposed the next Statement 11 for evaluation system resources protection against 
unauthorized access.  
Statement 11. The limited probability of system protection against unauthorized access 
exists under the condition of existence for stationary probability distributions for considered 
characteristics and their independence.  
One is equal to 
 
1
1 ,
M
prot over m
m
P P
     (14) 
where М is the conditional number of a barriers against an unauthorized access; Pover m – is 
the probability of overcoming the m-th barrier by violator, 
a) without due regard resources value 
 
 
b) with due regard resources value  
 
 
 
 
 
- time between changes of protection parameter;           
- a POV has been finished before the next change of protection parameter;              
- a POV has not been finished before the next change of protection parameter;           
- an unauthorized access has succeeded before the next change of protection parameter;             
- an unauthorized access has not succeeded before the next change of protection parameter 
Cases:     1 2 3  4 5 
t 
… … … …
Cases:          1                           2
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where Fm(t) is the PDF of time between changes of the m-th barrier with regulated 
parameter, fm is the mean time; 
Um(t) is the PDF of possible time of overcoming the m-th barrier, um – the mean time of a 
barrier overcoming. 
The final clear analytical formulas for modelling by the subsystem “Protection from 
unauthorized access” of CEISOQ+ are received after Lebesque-integration of (15) expression 
with due regard to Statement (11). 
3.11. Confidentiality of used information   
The model taking into account a period of resources objective value is the next. With the 
subsystem ”CONFIDENTIALITY” of the CEISOQ and CEISOQ+ the probabilities of 
providing information confidentiality by means of barriers 1st, 2nd..., mth from UAA and by 
means of all barriers may be estimated.  
There is proposed the next Statement 12 for evaluation system protection against 
unauthorized access during objective period, when resources value is high. 
Statement 12. The limited probability of system protection against unauthorized access 
during objective period, when resources value is high, exists under the condition of 
existence for stationary probability distributions for considered characteristics and their 
independence. One is equal to 
 .
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where М is the conditional number of a barriers against an unauthorized access; Pover m – is 
the risk of overcoming the m-th barrier by violator during objective period when resources 
value is high, 
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where Fm(t) is the PDF of time between changes of the m-th barrier parameters; Um(t) is the 
PDF of parameters decoding time of the m-th security system barrier, um – the mean time of 
a barrier overcoming; H(t) – is the PDF of objective period, when resources value is high. 
The final clear analytical formulas for modelling by the subsystem ”CONFIDENTIALITY”of 
CEISOQ+ are received after Lebesque-integration of (17) expression with due regard to 
Statement (12). 
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4. Models, software tools and methods to analyze and optimize system 
processes  
4.1. General approach to mathematical modelling standard processes 
The offered below mathematical models and supporting them dozens software tools 
complexes are focused on providing system standard requirements (ISO/IEC 15288 “System 
Engineering – System Life Cycle Processes”, ISO 9001 “Quality Management Systems - 
Requirements” etc.) on the base of mathematical modelling random processes that exist for 
any complex system in its life cycle. The basic idea of the models develops the idea used for 
information systems - see subsection 3.1. At the beginning there were created the models of 
complex CEISOQ and CEISOQ+, after that - the other models.  
The idea of mathematical modelling consists in the following. Any process represents set of 
the works which are carried out with any productivity at limitations for resources and 
conditions. This amount of works is characterized by expenses of resources (cost, material, 
human), accordingly works can be executed for different time with various quality. And 
conditions are characterized by set of the random factors influencing processes. It can be 
natural, technical, time, social factors, factors of the market and scientific and technical 
progress, say, all that is capable to affect processes. From the point of view of probability 
theory and the theory of regenerating processes it is possible to put formally, that all 
processes on macro-and micro-levels are cyclically repeated. If to assume, that number of 
recurrences of such processes is very large it is theoretically we can speak about probability 
of any events which can occur. The elementary example is a frequency loss of "heads" and 
«tails» at tossing up coins. If to enter conditions on a site (for example, on edge of gorge), on 
weather (a snow, a rain, a wind and so forth), on hardness of a ground it is possible to speak 
already not only about events of "heads" and «tails», and about other events falls, for 
example, that a wind will carry it away and coins will be lost. Actually course of complex 
system processes in life cycle from the mathematical point of view can be formalized 
absolutely similarly formalizations of tossing up coins process for the complicated 
conditions. In other words, the same as a matter of fact mathematical models can appear 
rather effective at their carry to other area of the practical applications. For example, the 
queueing theory which has arisen for calculations in a telephony, is used with success and 
for estimations at strikes on antiaircraft installations, and for estimations of time delays in 
networks of the computer systems, and for estimations of throughput of motorways etc.  
In each of the offered models time characteristics of processes, frequency characteristics of 
any events and characteristics, connected in due course (for example, the set amount of 
works at known speed of their performance will give representation about mean time of 
performance of these works) are used as input. As final or intermediate result probabilities 
of "success" during a given time of forecasting or risks of failures as an addition to 1. They 
are used as evaluated output. So, at formalization of concept «customer satisfaction» 
estimations were under construction for the general case of following reasons. The customer 
expects performance of the certain amount of works with the acceptable quality and/or 
admissible risks for given time and money. In a reality the amount of works can appear 
other, the degree of quality essentially depends on applied technologies and management 
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actions, time of performance and an expenses can undergo changes. As a result it is possible 
to speak about a degree of satisfaction in probability terms of performance of the set amount 
of works with the admissible quality for given time and money, and also about an expected 
and real part of the functional operations which are carried out with acceptable quality 
and/or admissible risks and expected and real expenses of the customer.  
Thus the main proposition, implemented in the offered models, concludes the next: all 
amounts of works, characteristics of their performance, possible events and other inputs are 
interpreted as expense of time which can be reflected on a timeline. Probability metrics on 
the introduced limited space of elementary events are calculated by the rule of the 
probability theory (see section 3).  
The basic ideas of correct integration of probability metrics are based on a combination and 
development of models, above presented, and consist in the following. 
1st idea. As models are mathematical, the use of the same mathematical models is possible 
by a semantic redefinition of input and output of modelling. The idea is mentioned only for 
understanding the further logic in construction of modeled system, subsystems, elements 
and corresponding metrics on the basis of integrated modules. 
2nd idea. For a complex estimation of the systems with parallel or consecutive structure 
existing models can be developed by usual methods of probability theory. For this purpose 
it is necessary to know a mean time between violations of integrity for each of element 
(similarly MTBF in reliability, but in application to violation of quality, safety etc.). Further 
taking into account idea 1 concept of a mean time between violations of an element integrity 
may be logically connected (for example, redefined) in concepts of a frequency of influences 
for penetrating into an element and a mean activation time of a penetrated danger source. 
The last concepts mean characteristics of threats.  
Note. As logic element a subsystem, compound object or separate indicator from a complex 
of product indicators can be used. 
Let's consider the elementary structure from two independent elements connected 
consecutively that means logic connection "AND" (Figure 11, left), or in parallel that means 
logic connection "OR" (Fig. 11, right).  
 
Figure 11. Illustration of system, combined from consecutively (left) or parallel (right) connected 
elements  
Let’s designate PDF of time between violations of i-th element integrity as Вi(t) =Р (τi≤ t), 
then:  
 
Some Applicable Methods to Analyze and Optimize System Processes in Quality Management 163 
1. time between violations of integrity for system combined from consecutively connected 
independent elements is equal to a minimum from two times τi: failure of 1st or 2nd 
elements (i.e. the system goes into a state of violated integrity when either 1st, or 2nd 
element integrity will be violated). For this case the PDF of time between violations of 
system integrity is defined by expression 
 В(t) = Р(min (τ1, τ2) ≤ t)=1- Р(min (τ1, τ2) > t)=1-Р(τ1 > t)Р(τ2 > t)= 1 – [1-В1(t)] [1- В2(t)].  (18) 
For exponential approximations: В(t)=1–[1-В1(t)][1-В2(t)]=1-exp(-t/ТMTBF1)exp(-t/ТMTBF2). 
Mean time between violations of integrity may be calculated by expression  
ТMTBF = 1/(1/ ТMTBF1+1/ ТMTBF2);  
2. time between violations of integrity for system combined from parallel connected 
independent elements (hot reservation) is equal to a maximum from two times τi: 
failure of 1st or 2nd elements (i.e. the system goes into a state of violated integrity when 
both 1st and 2nd element integrity will be violated). For this case the PDF of time 
between violations of system integrity is defined by expression 
 В(t) = Р(max (τ1, τ2) ≤ t)= Р(τ1 ≤ t)Р(τ2 ≤ t)= В1(t)В2(t).  (19) 
For exponential approximations: В(t)=В1(t)В2(t)=[1-exp(-t/ТMTBF1)] [1-exp(-t/ТMTBF2)] . Mean 
time between violations of integrity may be calculated by expression ТMTBF= ТMTBF1+ТMTBF2 - 
1/(1/ ТMTBF1+1/ ТMTBF2).  
Applying recurrently expressions (18) – (19), it is possible to receive PDF of time between 
violations of integrity for any complex system with parallel and/or consecutive structure. 
The illustration of threats, periodic control, monitoring and recovery of integrity for 
combined subsystems of estimated system is reflected on Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12. The illustration of threats, periodic control, monitoring and recovery of integrity for 
combined subsystems  
3rd idea. Mean recovery time for system combined from consecutively connected 
independent elements may be calculated by expression Тrec. = Т rec.1 ((1/ТMTBF1)/ (1/ТMTBF1+ 
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1/ТMTBF2))+Т rec.2 ((1/ТMTBF2)/ (1/ТMTBF1+ 1/ТMTBF2)), for system combined from parallel connected 
independent elements Т rec. = Т rec.1 ((1/ТMTBF2)/ (1/ТMTBF1+ 1/ТMTBF2))+Т rec.2 ((1/ТMTBF1)/ (1/ТMTBF1+ 
1/ТMTBF2)). Applying recurrently these expressions, it is possible to receive mean recovery 
time for any complex system with parallel and/or consecutive structure.  
4th idea. If integrity violations are absent then diagnostic time for each element is equal on 
the average Тdiag.. At the same time, if results of diagnostics require additional measures of 
integrity recovery this time increases. Thus mean time of diagnostics can be calculated 
iteratively with the given accuracy : 
1-st iteration: Тdiag. (1) = Тdiag. that is given by input for modelling. I.e. for 1st iteration at 
detection of violation it is supposed instant recovery of integrity. Risk to lose required 
integrity R(1) is calculated (for example, by the models of subsection 3.9). Here recovery time 
is not considered; 2-nd iteration: Тdiag. (2) = Тdiag.(1) (1 – R(1)) + Тrec. R(1), where R.(1) is risk to lose 
required integrity for input Тdiag. (1). Optimistic risk to lose required integrity R(2) is calculated; 
…, n-th iteration is carried out after calculating risk R.(n-1) for input Тdiag. (n-1): Тdiag.(n) = Тdiag.(n-1) 
(1 – R(n-1)) + Тrec. R(n-1), where R.(n-1) is risk to lose required integrity for input Тdiag. (n-1). Here 
recovery time is considering with the frequency aspiring to real, hence risk R.(n-1) ) will aspire 
to the real.  
The last iteration is when the given condition is satisfied: R(n) - R(n-1)   . 
5th idea. Existing models of section 3 are applicable to the system presented as one element. 
The main output of such system modelling is probability of providing system integrity or 
violation of system integrity during the given period of time. If a probability for all points 
Тgiven. from 0 to ∞ will be calculated, a trajectory of the PDF for each combined element 
depending on threats, periodic control, monitoring and recovery of integrity is 
automatically synthesized. The known kind of this PDF allows to define mean time of 
providing integrity or between violations of system integrity for every system element by 
traditional methods of mathematical statistics. And taking into account ideas 2-4 it gives 
necessary initial input for integration. 
Thus, applying ideas 1-5, there is possible an integration of metrics on the level of a PDF of 
time of providing system integrity or violation of system integrity. And it is the base for 
forecasting quality and risks.  
Note. Ideas 2-5 are implemented in the supporting software tools (Kostogryzov, Nistratov at 
al. (2004-2011)) - see, for example, the “Complex for evaluating quality of production 
processes” (patented by Rospatent №2010614145) - Figure 13. 
Thus models implement original author’s mathematical methodology based on probability 
theory, theory for regenerating processes and methods for system analysis. An application 
of offered methodology uses to evaluate probabilities of “success”, risks and related 
profitability and expenses. This helps to solve well-reasonly the next practical problems in 
system life cycle: 
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- analysis of system use expediency and profitability, selecting a suitable suppliers, 
substantiation of quality management systems for enterprises, substantiation of 
quantitative system requirements to hardware, software, users, staff, technologies;  
- requirements analysis, evaluation of project engineering decisions, substantiation of 
plans, projects and directions for effective system utilization, improvement and 
development;  
- evaluation of customer satisfaction in system design&development and possible 
dangers, detection of bottle-necks;  
- investigation of problems concerning potential threats to system operation including 
protection against terrorists and information security;  
- verification and validation system operation quality, investigation rational conditions 
for system use and ways for optimization etc. 
 
 
Figure 13.  Subsystems of the “Complex for evaluating quality of production processes” 
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The next complex for modelling of system life cycle processes “MODELLING OF 
PROCESSES” includes multi-functional software tools for evaluation of Agreement (models 
and software tools “Acquisition”, “Supply”), Enterprise (models and software tools 
“Environment Management”, “Investment Management”, “Life Cycle Management”, 
“Resource Management”, “Quality Management”), Project (models and software tools 
“Project Planning”, “Project Assessment”, “Project Control”, “decision-making”, “risk 
management”, “configuration management”, “information management”) and Technical 
Processes Modelling (models and software tools “Requirements Definition”, “requirements 
analysis”, “architectural design”, “human factor ”, “implementation”, “integration”, 
“verification”, “transition”, “validation”, “operation”, “maintenance”, “disposal” tools) – 
see Figures 14-17 (one separate box is an implementation of one or more mathematical 
models) (Kostogryzov, Nistratov at al. (2004-2011)).  
 
  
Figure 14. Software tools for evaluation of Agreement Processes 
 
 
Figure 15. Software tools for evaluation of Enterprise Processes 
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Figure 16. Software tools for evaluation of Project Processes 
 
Figure 17. Software tools for evaluation of Technical Processes 
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4.2. The formal statement of problems for system analysis and optimization 
According to ISO 9000 management is defined as coordinated activities to direct and control 
an organization. In general case control is considered as the process of comparing actual 
performance with planned performance, analyzing variances, evaluating possible 
alternatives, and taking appropriate corrective action as needed (PMBOK). From system 
analysis point of view the main function of management is a purposeful change of a 
condition of process, object or system. Thus the process, object or system considered as 
managed if among all changes there is available one by means of which the purpose can be 
achieved. Management is based on a choice of one of set of any alternatives. Rational 
management is the management leading achievement of the purpose by criterion of an 
extremum (a minimum or a maximum) the chosen parameter at a set of limitations. 
Classical examples of rational management generally are maximization of a prize (profit, a 
degree of quality or safety, etc.) at limitations on expenses or minimization of expenses at 
limitations on a admissible level of quality and-or safety.  
It is clear, that in life cycle of systems criteria and limitations vary. We shall consider briefly 
an essence popular today «process approach» for design, development and improvement of 
systems management quality according to ISO 9001. For successful operation the 
organization should define and carry out management of the interconnected kinds of 
activities. The activity using resources and performed with the purpose of transformation 
inputs in purposeful outputs, actually represents process. Thus, "process approach» means 
the application of system processes in view of their identification and interaction. The model 
of system management quality, based on «process approach», is directed finally to meet 
customer satisfaction. For rational management of processes it is necessary to know and 
predict their behaviour at various influences. For this purpose it is offered to use the 
mathematical models including models offered in this book. The metrics entered in these 
models, or their combination may be used as criteria metrics. Actually they are the 
quantitative measure (criterion function) describing degree of achievement of a purpose in 
view of management at various stages of system life cycle. For the enterprise there is 
important, for example, to optimize system management quality. A maximum of the 
probability of qualified work performance (i.e. in time and without any defects) or the 
probability of successful life-cycle processes running on condition that the competitiveness 
of each product type is retained can be used as criterion with corresponding limitations. For 
security services it is necessary to provide safety of object, process or system up to the mark. 
In this case the criterion of a minimum of expenses at limitations on an admissible risk level 
of dangerous influence on system contrary to counteraction measures or a minimum of risk 
of dangerous influence at limitations on expenses are possible. For the customer and the 
developer of the project the end result is important. In this case the criterion of a maximum 
of a relative quantity of system functions which are carried out with admissible quality or a 
relative level of customer satisfaction can be used as the integrated measure. The statement 
of problems for system analysis includes definition of conditions, threats and estimation a 
level of critical measures.  
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Thus the final choice of integrated measures is allocated on a payoff to the customer in view 
of specificity of created or maintained system. As probability parameters give higher 
guarantees in estimations of a degree of achieving purposes in comparison with average 
value at a choice it is recommended to use probability (i.e. on a degree of system quality 
operation - probability of providing admissible function performance quality during the 
given period of time) as the cores. And evaluated time characteristics (for example the mean 
time between violations of admissible system operation quality) are offered as auxiliary.  
For example, there are applicable the next general formal statements of problems for system 
optimization:  
1. on the stages of system concept, development, production and support: 
system parameters, software, technical and management measures (Q) are the most rational 
for the given period if on them the minimum of expenses (Zdev.) for creation of system is 
reached: 
dev. rational dev.Z (Q )  min Z (Q),
Q

 
at limitations on probability of an admissible level of quality Pquality (Q) ≥ Padm. and expenses 
for operation  
Сoper. (Q) ≤ С adm. and under other development, operation or maintenance conditions; 
2. on operation stage : 
system parameters, software, technical and management measures (Q) are the most rational 
for the given period of operation if on them the maximum of probability of providing 
admissible system operation quality is reached: 
quality rational qualityP (Q )  max P (Q),
Q

 
at limitations on probability of an admissible level of quality Pquality (Q) ≥ Padm. and expenses 
for operation  
Сoper. (Q) ≤ С adm. and under other operation or maintenance conditions. 
Of course these statements may be transformed into problems of expenses or risk 
minimization in different limitations. System parameters, software, technical and 
management measures (Q) is a rule a vector of input – see examples. There may be 
combination of these formal statements in system life cycle.  
The order for use the developed classical formal approach to analyze and optimize system 
processes in quality management is illustrated by Figure 18. When analyst use this approach 
he’d like for several minutes to formalize a problem, perform mathematical modeling, 
analyze system processes in different conditions, choose the most rational variant and 
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prepare analytical report. Such possibilities exist: an analyst should perform mathematical 
modelling by the Internet versions of the offered models – see Figure 19. He prepares input 
and receives analytical report in Word or pdf-file about 50-100 sheets as a result of 
interaction. This report will be formed automatically and include a formalization of analyst’s 
problem, input, results of mathematical modeling in pictures (as demonstrated above in 
examples), analysis of system processes behaviour for different conditions, choice of the 
most rational variant and recommendations.” It means that any analyst, understanding the 
used mathematical model, can receive during 1-3 minutes scientifically proved analytical 
report after interaction with an Internet version of model.  
This report may be used for making decision and developing his independent report with 
additional materials. It is virtual outsourcing of high system analysis on the base of the 
offered mathematical models. The purpose is to give to analysts an opportunity of accessible 
and cheap high technology of studying standard processes in life cycle of estimated systems. 
This work has begun, the first models are accessible (see www.mathmodels.net). 
 
Figure 18. The approach to analyze and optimize system processes 
The presented software tools complexes allow to solve problems for system analysis and 
optimization. Expected pragmatic effect from their application is the next: it is possible to 
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provide essential system quality rise and/or avoid wasted expenses in system life cycle on 
the base of modelling system processes by the offered mathematical models. 
 
Figure 19. Mathematical modelling by the Internet versions of the offered models 
 
Figure 20. The offered way is the use of created methods to analyze and optimize system processes 
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Thereby necessary attributes of the offered innovative approach to control of system 
processes in quality management are above formed. Traditional approaches consist as a 
matter of fact in a pragmatical filtration of the information. In the decisions the responsible 
person, making decision, is guided firstly by the own experience and the knowledge and the 
advices of those persons of a command to whom trusts. Intuitively forming ideas which 
seem correct, this person chooses only that information which proves idea. The denying 
information is often ignored and more rare – leads to change of initial idea. This approach 
can be explained from the facts that at absence or limitation of used models it is difficult to 
investigate at once many ideas for given time. The presented models, methods and software 
tools, reducing long time of modelling (from several days, weeks and months to few 
seconds and minutes) change this situation cardinally.  
The offered innovative approach is at the beginning substantiation of the system 
requirements, purposefully capable to lead to a success. Further, the responsible person, 
equipped by a set of necessary mathematical models and their software tools possibilities to 
forecasting quality and risks, is powered for generation of the proved ideas and effective 
decisions. These decisions are physically clear because of using accessible and operative 
analysis and optimization of processes in system life cycle. The offered approach allows to 
go «from a pragmatical filtration of information to generation of the proved ideas and 
effective decisions». The effect from implementation in system life cycle is commensurable 
with expenses for its creation (see Figure 20 and www.mathmodels.net). 
We will demonstrate usability, universality and efficiency of the offered models, methods 
and software tools on the examples of their application for the analysis of "human factor», 
information actuality in commerce, errors during a use of SCADA-systems, efficiency of 
non-destroying control, preservation of foods quality, fire extinguishing, reliability of 
engineering equipment for enterprise object, flights safety in conditions of terrorist threats, 
information security, and also to the forecasts of risks for complex multipurpose systems.  
5. Examples 
Example 1 («Human factor»). Modern enterprises total tens – hundreds various workers. To 
solve a given functional enterprise problem there are required, as a rule, efforts of several 
specialists. For example, information gathering and control, its security providing, database 
and computing process administration, maintenance of computer equipment and 
information use are performed by different people. It is clear that their qualifications must 
be very high. Let’s examine an example when it is not so. The reader may remember 
situations from his life.  
Let the problem solution depends on joint but independent actions of 5 people. Let each of 4 
specialists make 1 error a month and the 5th inexperienced person makes 1 error a day. 
System recovery time after an error equals to 30 minutes. It is required to evaluate 
faultlessness of such group’s actions within a week. 
The solution is based on the use of the CEISOQ+ subsystem «Faultlessness of man’s 
actions» (see model in subsection 3.2). Integral computation results reveal that the 
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probability of faultless joint actions of the first 4 skilled specialists within a 40-hours 
workweek equals to 0.80 but the low-quality work of the 5th unexperienced member mocks 
the whole group work. Indeed, the probability of faultless actions decreases to 0.15 (see 
Figure 21). Thus the computed results prove quantitatively the importance of thorough 
specialists training because a man is the main system bottleneck. It is impossible to detect all 
the system defects, but in some cases there is no full protection from “a fool”. The quality 
management acts very wisely. As a rule an instructions with a training database and 
introduced assessment of users’ readiness for a work with the real system is used. The 
proposed methods allow to estimate achieved levels of such system readiness.  
 
Figure 21. An estimation of human factor, examples 1-2 
The question is lawful - what MTBF an worker should possess to provide a faultlessness of 
the actions with probability 0.99 within 8 hours of the working day? According to 
calculations the MTBF not less than 850 working hours is acceptable – see Figure 21 right. It 
is more than 8-hours working day in 106 times (!), i.e. 4 months are necessary to work 
without errors, as the robot. 
Example 2 (A role of information actuality in commerce). Nowadays the product market is 
being changed into an electronic one. What level of information actuality is peculiar to the 
successful companies within the possibilities of quality management and information 
technologies?  
Solution. We’ll try to answer this question by the subsystem “Actuality” of CEISOQ+ using 
as an example the worldwide known retail outlets network “Wall Mart”, distributed in the 
USA, Canada, Mexico etc. (see model in subsection 3.5). Let’s define an information aspect 
which makes for the company’s success.  
To increase productivity of each worker salesclerks were equipped with manual bar-code 
readers. Information contained in a bar-code is shown on a display. A worker can get a 
retrospective picture of products saling within a day, a week and several weeks. Moreover, 
on each article there are data about its quantity in the shop floor, in stock and how much has 
been ordered, i.e. everything what may be necessary for ordering. Let’s evaluate actuality of 
information used by this system. It is logical to admit that significant changes happen not 
more frequent than 2 times per working day. There may be a leap in demand and supply, a 
change of goods quantity ordered by a customer, force majeur. Due to immediate 
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information gathering by salesclerks (with the help of bar-code readers it takes 3 seconds), 
its transfer by satellite communications (10 seconds) and entering into a database (1 second) 
actuality of information in this network is not less than 0.992 (see variants i=1-4 on 
Figure22). It means that for successful company the probability to use actual information 
against non-actual one is more in 124 times (0.992/0.008=124)!  
Correct use of this information turns out to be very effective. Using information read from a 
bar-code, which is transferred to the headquarters, they may order lots of goods, distribute 
them into their outlets and not worry about goods warehousing. For comparison, other 
shops, where usual bar-code readers are used and information is updated hourly, use 
information which actuality equals to 0.3-0.7 (see variants i=5-8 on Fig.23). Thus at the 
moment of use information can be as true as false. On the resulted figures it is possible to 
feel information roots of perfection quality management. According to “precedent” 
principle the achievable level 0.992 of information actuality can be defined as admissible. 
 
Figure 22. Input for CEISOQ+ and comparative results of modelling 
Example 3 (Errors during a use of SCADA system). The control towers use SCADA system 
(Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition) for making decision. The data gathering and 
processing activities are modeled to evaluate the risk of misinterpreting of potentially 
dangerous events in control towers. Wrong interpretation may be caused by errors of 
dispatcher personnel, which can miss important information or turn harmless information 
into dangerous one, fails of SCADA system. Let’s consider a control station receiving 
information from the SCADA system for following processing. The information flow is 
measured in some conventional units and the information flow is of 100 units per hour. The 
total information contains not more than 1% of data related to potentially dangerous events. 
Taking into account automatic data analysis we suppose the speed of event interpretation to 
 
Some Applicable Methods to Analyze and Optimize System Processes in Quality Management 175 
be near 30 sec per information unit. In this case 100 information units will be processed 
during 50 min. At that the frequency of errors for the whole dispatcher shift on duty, 
including fails of the SCADA system itself is about 1 error per year according to statistical 
data. The task is to estimate the risk of misinterpreting events on the control station for a time 
period of 1 hour, during one dispatcher shift turn of 8 hours, 1 month, 1 year, and 10 years.  
The solution is based on the use of the subsystem «Risk evaluation. Risk of inadequate 
interpretation of events» of the software tools “Complex for evaluating quality of production 
processes” (see model in subsection 3.6). The analysis of modelling shows (see Figure 23) that 
for short time periods such as one shift turn or even for a month the risk of mistaken 
analytical conclusion is small enough (0.00076 and 0.07 accordingly). But when the time 
period grows the risk increases and becomes 0.565 for a year and almost unity (0.9998) during 
time period of 10 years. This means that during a month the probability for errors of 
dispatcher personal or SCADA system fails to occur is very small and their operation will be 
almost faultless. But for a more long time period such as a year is considered 1-2 errors of 
dispatcher personal or system SCADA fails will occur for certain. Considering high reliability 
of SCADA system and according to “precedent” principle the achievable level 0.07 for the 
risk of mistaken analytical conclusion during a month can be defined as acceptable. 
 
Figure 23. Some results of modelling a SCADA-system 
Example 4 (Efficiency of non-destroying control). Let’s consider two competing enterprises 
which are suppliers of pipes for transportation of production and guided in their quality 
management system by various technical politics. The first of these enterprises, guided by 
an innovative way of development with rational application of modern information 
technologies, effectively uses (as believed) existing innovations for quality and risks 
management. The second company uses cheaper and out-of-date technologies, keeping 
competitiveness on the market at the expense of it. At the enterprises various methods of 
non-destroying control are applied to revealing defects.  
The first enterprise acquires input production from suppliers after quality control by all 
recommended methods of non-destroying control (acoustic, magnetic, optical, radiating, 
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radio wave, thermal, electromagnetic etc.) that is confirmed by test reports and certificates 
on ISO 9001 and on output production. As a result for total controllable production in 
100000 units per a month (for example, production tons, running meters etc.) the part of 
possible defects before control is 5%, a frequency of errors during the control is no more 
than 2 defects in a year (these are the latent defects not revealed by existing methods or 
passed at the control). 
The second enterprise is satisfied by certificate on ISO 9001. And only radio wave method of 
non-destroying control is used by the suppliers. It allows to reveal such defects, as 
stratifications and deviations on a thickness in metal products (i.e. no more than 10 % of 
possible defects). At the expense of it the part of possible defects before the control is 
already 20 %, moreover, at the control defects of moulding (slag and flux inclusions, 
shrinkable bowls, gas bubbles, cracks, etc.), defects of processing by pressure (internal and 
superficial cracks, ruptures, tempers, dents, etc.), defects of heat treatment (overheats, 
hardening and hydrogen cracks, etc.) are missed. Totally about 30 defects per a year are 
possible. 
Omitting questions of profits, we will compare technical politics of these enterprises by a 
risk of mistaken analytical conclusion within a month. 
The solution is based on the same software tools as for example 3, but difference is the next: 
according to the 1-st idea of subsection 4.1 instead of metric “Risk of inadequate 
interpretation of events” we use metric “Risk of mistaken analytical conclusions”. Input and 
results of modelling are on Figure 24.  
The comparative analysis of the received dependences has shown: 
- the risk of mistaken analytical conclusions for 1st first enterprise is 0.15, and for 2nd one 
– 0.92 (!); 
- if the volume of controllable production is changed from 50000 to 200000 units per a 
month the risk increases for 1st enterprise from 0.08 to 0.58, and for 2nd one – from 0.71 
to 0.96; 
- the increase in a part of possible defects twice essentially does not influence value of 
risk, i.e. efficiency of applied technologies of the control depends essentially on other 
parameters, in particular from frequency of possible errors; 
- if frequency of possible errors increases twice than the risk increases for 1st enterprise 
from 0.08 to 0.28, and for 2nd one – from 0.71 to 0.99. 
Conclusion: For 1st enterprise the risk of mistaken analytical conclusions at level 0.15 after 
the control within a month can be recognized as acceptable. The 2nd enterprise supplies 
frankly defected production (probability nearby 0.9) that will negatively affect further at 
system operation. 
Example 5 (Preservation of foods quality). We will demonstrate foods quality management 
on an example of probabilistic analysis of processes that are peculiar for grain storage. 
Quality of the grain supplied on longtime storage, decreases because of influences of 
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dangerous biological, chemical and physical factors. Let’s estimate the possible period 
before such moment of time when storing grain begin to loss required quality, and also 
expediency of introduction of continuous monitoring of grain quality.  
 
Figure 24. Comparative estimation of efficiency of quality management for enterprises which are 
suppliers of pipes 
The solution is based on the use of the subsystem «Risk evaluation. Risk of uncontrollable 
development of situations» of the software tools “Complex for evaluating quality of 
production processes” (see model in subsection 3.9). The list of dangerous factors (threats), 
controllable parameters and proactive actions at grain storage in real conditions is resulted 
in table 1 (Machikhina et al. (2007)). 
The cleared, dry and non-contaminated grain may be stored lost-free some years. However, 
the insects which are present in granaries and round them, occupy grain and breed. For 
example, every 2 months rice weevil increases in the number at 15-45 times at temperature 
from 20˚С to 25˚С. If in batch of wheat in weight 1000 tons contamination reaches 16 bugs on 
1 kg of grain, losses are expected more than 5 %. The grain polluted by wreckers and 
products of their vital functions (excrements, dead bodies, uric acid, etc.), becomes toxic. It 
cannot be used for the food purposes. Therefore we will consider security of grain from 
insects, believing within the example, that exactly the main dangers are from them.  
Let’s a frequency of latent occurrence of critical situations during hot months is often not 
less than 1 time a day (i.e. every day at air temperature above 12˚С infection or the further 
damage of grain is possible). Our consideration: at 12-15˚С a duration of insects 
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development (for example, weevil) is 141-376 days, and in a laying from 300 to 600 eggs a 
cycle of development is 1.5-2 months. In the conditions of cooling of grain below a 
temperature threshold of insects development (more low than 10.2˚С) their pairing, eggs 
putting off and development of all stages stop. Insects become inactive and almost do not 
eat. Long stay of insects at such temperature leads to their slow extinction. Besides, 
humidity maintenance at a level of 13%-15% also promotes extinction of insects.  
Dangerous factors 
(threats) 
Controllable parameters Proactive measures 
Biological: 
- microorganisms; 
- contamination of grain 
stocks by insects 
Grain, spoilt as a result of self-
warming and growing 
mouldy.  
Insects and pincers, a dung of 
rodents. 
Observance of requirements of 
the standard documentation on 
grain storage.  
Complex of practical and 
exterminating measures against 
insects.  
Chemical: 
- mycotoxins;  
- products of fats 
oxidation in grain (free 
fat acids, aldehydes, 
ketones, peroxides); 
- harmful products of 
vital functions of grain 
wreckers;  
- pesticides 
The content of the spoilt and 
damaged grains as a result of 
microbiological spoiling. 
Organoleptic indicators 
(colour, a smell), and also the 
content of the beaten and 
brought down grains. 
Total density of pollution by 
live and dead wreckers, no 
more than 15 copies /kg. 
Residual quantities. 
Observance of the general 
sanitary norms. 
Observance of regulations for 
pesticides use and terms of grain 
endurance after processing.  
Decrease of storage temperature 
to low positive temperatures of 
air.  
Observance of the instruction for 
pest control. 
Observance of requirements to 
grain after desinsection. 
Physical: 
- extraneous subjects, 
casual and weed 
impurity; 
- grain temperature and 
humidity  
 
Rough, large and casual 
impurity. 
Stable temperatureand 
humidity 
Grain clearing on separators. 
Regular cooling of grain to low 
positive temperature (no more 
10˚С). 
Observance of the requirements 
of the general technological 
regulations 
Table 1. The list of dangerous factors, controllable parameters and proactive measures at grain storage 
Thus, input for modelling is defined: frequency of latent occurrence of critical situations – 
from 1 time a day to 1 time a week; mean time of danger source activation – 1.5 months; 
time between diagnostics of system integrity (analysis of temperature and humidity) – 1 
hour; duration of diagnostic, including recovery time – 1 hour.  
It is enough to predict a risk of uncontrollable development of situations with grain  
storage. The results of modelling for the period from 1 year to 6 years have shown the 
following.  
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If a frequency of latent occurrence of critical situations is 1-2 times a day, risk of 
uncontrollable development of situations within a year will grow from 0.28 to 0.47, and 
during 2-years period it can exceed 0.5 – see Figure 25 left. 
These results can be interpreted so: if storage conditions daily promote occurrence of insects, 
then for a 1-2 years grain quality loss is possible at the same degree as preservation of quality. 
Thus the next conclusion is right: the accepted conditions of grain storage in a granary leads to 
inadmissible damages. For prevention such danger scenario the following basic requirements 
(Machikhina et al. (2007)) should be performed: a smell unusual for grain should not be felt; 
isolation from dampness and from penetration of subsoil waters should be provided; grain-
elevator should not have unfixed vertical and horizontal joints; doors should be densely 
closed, floors and walls should be smooth, without cracks, roofs – in a serviceable condition; 
fixtures should be protected by protective caps with grids; inlet of active ventilation should be 
densely closed preventing a penetration of an atmospheric precipitation, etc.  
 
Figure 25. Some detail results of modelling and analysing 
Performance of these requirements conducts to decrease a frequency of latent occurrence of 
critical situations in granaries. Further we will answer the question – what about a risk in 
conditions of more rare occurrences of critical situations? And, on the contrary, what the 
level of a frequency of latent occurrence of critical situations can be considered as admissible 
for granaries? 
Results of modelling show: if frequency of latent occurrence of critical situations will be 1-2 
times a week, risk of uncontrollable development of situations within a year will grow from 
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0.05 to 0.09, i.e. the risk decreases in 5-7 times! (against the level from 0.28 to 0.47), and 
within 6 years risk will make 0.25-0.43 ( it is better, than risk within a year when frequency 
of latent occurrence of critical situations is 1-2 times a day!) – see Fig. 24 right. These results 
can be interpreted so: if storage conditions prevent from occurrence of insects with the 
frequency more often, than once a week, probability of preservation of grain quality within 
3-6 years exceeds probability of quality loss in 3-5 times! 
The results of modelling are quantitatively confirmed by results of long-term researches of 
the Russian Research Institute of Grain (Machikhina et al. (2007)). According to these 
researches experimental batches of grain wheat met to standard requirements of class grain 
has been kept within 6 years without deterioration in dry, cleared and the cooled condition. 
Moreover, the received values of risk can define admissible quality for grain storage. 
Indeed, new recommended result is: the acceptable risk of uncontrollable development of 
situations should not exceed 0.10 for 1 year and 0.25 for 6 years of grain storage. 
Example 6 (Fire extinguishing). An automatic system of fire extinguishing for an enterprise 
of dangerous manufacture operates, as a rule, on following principles: 
provision of multilevel protection, which highest level means a stop of all servers operation; 
use of diagnostic results of devices and technological equipment.  
The next measures are carried out for system availability to provide operation and fault 
tolerance: reservation of input for signals to acting; duplication of data transfer for 
switching-off equipment; consideration of switching-off only at the command of the safety 
officer (from the button); the voltage control in chains for executive mechanisms; 
implementation of intellectual devices with self-diagnostics; reservation of power supplies; 
reservation of safety control and emergency stop in conditions of failure of the basic system 
means. 
To avoid false operation after detecting a fire-dangerous situation, the automatic system of 
fire extinguishing starts with delay 0,5 seconds. Control from the panel of the safety officer 
is blocked for the period of operating the automatic system of fire extinguishing. Duration of 
diagnostics with possible actions of fire-prevention protection is about 8.5 seconds. Control 
comes back to safety officer after end of automatic system act. 
The solution is based on the use of the subsystem «Risk evaluation. Risk of uncontrollable 
development of situations» of the software tools “Complex for evaluating quality of 
production processes” (see model in subsection 3.9). But according to the 1-st idea of 
subsection 4.1 instead of metric “Risk of uncontrollable development of situations” we use 
metric “Risk of occurrence an emergency”. Analysis of real situations allowed to form 
approximately the next input for modelling: frequency of occurrence of a danger source = 1 
time a day, activation time of a danger source = 1 minute, the period between integrity 
diagnostics = 0.5с, duration of diagnostics with performance of actions of fire-prevention 
protection = 8.5с, MTBF for system = 2000 hours (it is commensurable with MTBF for 
complex technical systems and also with the period between maintenance service). Mean 
time to system recovery is about 1 hour. 
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Results of modelling show the next (see Figure 26). At the expense of automatic monitoring 
and fire-prevention protection the risk of occurrence an emergency within a year equals to 0. 
065, and within 2th years is nearby 0.125. The mean time between possible emergencies will 
be about 131590 hours (this does not mean, that such successful system operation time is 
peculiar to the equipment. This figure characterizes effectiveness of the whole technology of 
the control, monitoring and integrity recovery in the given conditions of threats).  
 
Figure 26. Dependence of risk from the forecasting period  
As modern automatic systems of fire extinguishing are an example an effective utilization of 
information technologies implemented into various industrial systems, the reached level of 
risk (not above 0.065 within a year) can be de facto recognized as admissible according to 
“precedent” principle. At the same time, the risk of occurrence an emergency within 3th 
years will already exceed 0.6. This means, that at daily threats of a fire within the next 3-5 
years at least one potentially emergency will be real. And moreover it can’t be prevented by 
the operating automatic system. Here the additional measures of fire-prevention protection 
(including forces from the state fire service) should be provided.  
Example 7 (Reliability of engineering equipment for enterprise objects). Prediction of 
operation reliability of computer-aided engineering equipment against usual non-
automated engineering equipment is needed for the stages “Concept” and “Development” 
within quality management. Let the estimated object (for instance, the center of information 
processing and storage) includes power supply subsystem, an air conditioning subsystem, 
supported by 2 sources of an uninterrupted supply and a server, supported by 1 source of 
an uninterrupted supply and disks for information storage, supported also by 2 sources of 
an uninterrupted supply. In turn, the power supply subsystem includes the switchboards, 
supporting by 2 sources of an uninterrupted supply. All listed above engineering equipment 
is supported by 2 engine-generating installations.  
The solution is based on the use of the subsystem «Prediction of integral quality» of the 
software tools “Complex for evaluating quality of production processes” (see combination 
of models from subsections 3.2 and 3.9 according to proposition of subsection 4.1). Within 
the example two subsystems are allocated (see Figure 27): a subsystem 1 – the city power 
supply formalized as basic and reserve subsystems; a subsystem 2 – an object fragment. 
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It is supposed, that operation reliability of the object is provided, if “AND” in 1st subsystem 
“AND” in 2nd subsystem there will be no power supply infringements during predicted term.  
 
Figure 27. Logic model of the object for modelling (PSS - power supply subsystem, ACS - air 
conditioning subsystem, SUS - source of an uninterrupted supply, EGI - engine-generating installation) 
Results of modelling are reflected by Figure 28. The analysis shows, that, at estimated 
technology of the control, monitoring and integrity recovery the MTBF for computer-aided 
engineering equipment will equal to 42219 hours. The probability of reliable object 
operation within a year equals to 0.828. In turn, for usual non-automated engineering 
equipment (there is no the monitoring implemented for computer-aided engineering 
equipment) efficiency characterized by estimations on Figure 28 below. 
 
Figure 28. Results of modelling for example 7 
For usual non-automated engineering equipment the MTBF will make 16196 hours (it is at 
2.44 time less, than for computer-aided engineering equipment that uses monitoring), and 
the probability of reliable object operation within a year equals to 0.649 (at 1.26 time less, 
than for computer-aided engineering equipment). Moreover, without automation for 2 years 
the probability of at least one failure (0.52) exceeds probability of reliable operation (0.48). 
Against this the probability of reliable object operation within 2 years for computer-aided 
engineering equipment is more at 1.5 times and will not fall low than 0.7 .  
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Example 8 (Flights safety in conditions of terrorist threats). We understand that a system 
component of the global terrorism problems can’t be fully studied within any monograph. 
Nevertheless, we’ll offer an approach, which allows to estimate quantitatively and compare 
some organizational and technical ways of its solution within quality management (safety 
aspect). From the modelling point of view a flying airplane is a protected system operating 
in conditions of threats to its integrity during the flight. We’ll try to answer the next 
questions: “How effective was the existing before 09/11 system of flights safety provision in 
Russia and the USA from the point of view of opposing to terrorists?” and “How this level 
of the safety may be increased and by what measures?” 
The answers are based on the use of subsystems «Risk evaluation. Risk of uncontrollable 
development of situations» and «Risk evaluation. Efficiency of protection barriers» of the 
software tools “Complex for evaluating quality of production processes” (see models from 
subsections 3.9 and 3.10). 
Note. The basic results of an example 8 have been received in a week after events of 09/11, 
and presented for working groups on system and software engineering WG7 and WG10 
SC7 JTC1 ISO/IEC in Moscow in October 2001г. 
For answering the first question “How effective was the existing before 09/11 system of 
flights safety provision?” comparative analysis is based on the use of subsystems «Risk 
evaluation. Risk of uncontrollable development of situations» and «Risk evaluation. 
Efficiency of protection barriers» of the software tools “Complex for evaluating quality of 
production processes” (see models from subsections 3.9 and 3.10).  
To gather necessary input data for modelling let’s recall pictures of the some acts of 
terrorism. One of these is a highjacking of the Russian airliner Tu-154 (the company 
“Vnukovo” airlines) on March 15, 2001. And it is a terrorist attack on the USA committed on 
September 11 with the help of several passenger airliners. 
The passenger airliner Tu-154 was flying from Istanbul to Moscow with 162 passengers on 
board. Three terrorists armed with cold steel captured the airliner and threatening with a 
bomb blowing-up made the pilots fly to Medina (Saudi Arabia). All terrorist attempts to 
break open the door to the cockpit failed. The pilots not controlled by the terrorists 
explained the situation on board, terrorists’ maneuvers, necessary details concerning the 
airliner arrangement before the start of a rescue operation. Moreover, they secretly 
communicated with stewardesses situated in the plane cabin. On March 16 Arabian troops 
of special purposes made an attempt to capture the airliner. A Russian stewardess, Julia 
Fomina, who was fatally wounded during that storm, opened a ramp. At the cost of her life 
she rescued lives of the passengers. From the moment of highjacking till the moment of 
capturing there passed about 24 hours. 
In September an unprecedented attack was committed on the USA. That attack killed 
thousands of people. Two skyscrapers of the World Trade Center were rammed by two 
passenger airliners “Boeing-767” and “Boeing-757” (the company American Airlines), 
captured by terrorists on their flights from Boston to Los Angeles (92 people on board) and 
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from Washington to Los Angeles (64 people on board). The Pentagon was attacked by “ 
Boeing-76” (the company “United Airlines”) flying from Newark (New Jersey) to San 
Francisco (45 people on board). 
Now we go to modelling of unauthorized access to airliner resources. From the point of 
view of terrorists opposing formalization the existing system of security provision 
represents a sequence of technological barriers, which should be overcome. What are the 
barriers? 
For the existing before 09/11 safety system it is: the 1st barrier is pass and inter-object modes 
in aerodromes and centers of air traffic control; the 2nd barrier is a preflight examination and 
control of passengers and their luggage during the registration; the 3rd barrier is a preflight 
examination before boarding; the 4th barrier is a lock-up door to the cockpit; the 5th barrier is 
an on-line warning about a highjacking (this barrier is critical if terrorists try to hide the fact 
of highjacking). It is clear that the first three barriers if a passenger behaves well are 
conditional because terrorists reveal their criminal nature only on board an aircraft. 
Moreover, the character of the last terrorism acts proves that among terrorists there are 
trained executors. The terrorist actions are worked out in details.  
Taking the above considerations into account we’ll form input data for modelling. At first 
we’ll discuss time of barriers overcoming. For a trained terrorist (not “wanted”, having valid 
documents and luggage) both in Russia and in the USA mean time of the 1st barrier 
overcoming equals to 10 minutes necessary for identification (m=1). For an untrained 
terrorist the main task is not to be taken into those who are checked by security service of 
the aerodrome. Let only 0.5% of passengers be checked. This check may result in 
imprisonment during 10 days. This means that mean time of a barrier overcoming equals to 
≈ 1.36 hours. 
To evaluate input characteristics of the 2nd and the 3rd barriers we’ll analyze the existing facts 
and specialists’ reports. On one hand prevention of guns and explosives carrying through 
customs in the USA seems to be rather reliable. From the other hand carrying of penknives 
with blade length up to 8 centimeters had been officially allowed before September 11. On 
September 11 the terrorists were armed with knives for cutting of thick carton (“cutters”). 
Moreover, American specialists in terrorism-fighting cite facts when in 2000 employees of 
the USA Department of Transport decided to check 8 American airports for their vigilance. 
They could carry bags with guns in 68 cases of 100 ones. Finally in several shops of airports 
there were sold knives-souvenirs, which are brought right to the airline ladder, i.e. without 
any control. In Russia the situation was not better. It was worsened by the fact that in some 
airports modern systems of electronic examination are not used. Let’s assume that a fraction 
of such airports mounts to 30%. The above-mentioned allows to state that for a trained 
terrorist overcoming of the 2nd and 3rd barriers in the USA takes about 2 hours (for each 
barrier) and in Russia – 1 hour. The same actions will take an untrained terrorist 10 days 
appeared as a result of his/her imprisonment. Then in the USA mean time of a barrier 
overcoming equals to ≈ 3.3 days and in Russia it equals to ≈ 2.6 days. Mean time of pass and 
examination in the airport is not less than a year before any essential change happens 
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(usually before a next serious incident and start of an appropriate fight for providing 
airports security). The authors of the monograph know about real control service on local 
airlines of the USA and Russia not through hearsay. Thus the input data necessary for 
computations concerning the first three barriers may be considered to be formed. 
The 4th and 5th barriers are the only barriers on board an airliner. A cockpit door in American 
Airlines “Boeing” is usual. It can be broken within a few minutes. This was done to rescue 
pilots in case of a catastrophe. For the same purpose some airliners take off and land with 
open doors. To make it clear let’s set mean time of the “Boeing” 4th barrier overcoming equal 
to 15 minutes. A door of a Russian airliner is armored. Impossibility of such a door breaking 
within a few hours allowed avoiding more grave consequences on March 15. Nonetheless, 
according to the specialists’ opinion it is not a great difficulty to blow it up or open it with 
the help of a fire extinguishing ax or a forcer. Let’s assume that using additional improvised 
means it takes not more than 2 hours to overcome this barrier. 
Russian aircraft are furnished with a special button of reporting about a highjacking. Not all 
foreign airliners are furnished with such a button and terrorists may cut off the 
communication with the Earth. According to specialists it is possible to escape radars by 
reducing height to its critical point and sharp changing of an airliner’s course. On Earth it is 
possible to guess that an airliner is high-jacked only on the basis of indirect signs: a 
disappeared communication, a change of course, strange maneuvers. Sometimes passengers 
may use mobile phones what happened on September 11 in the USA. So, let’s set time of 
preventing a warning about the highjacking equal to flight time. 
Results of modelling are on Figure 29. An analysis of computation results reveals the 
following: 
- both in Russia and the USA the existing systems of flights safety provision are very 
effective against inexperienced or untrained terrorists (the probability of security 
provision is not less than 0.99). It is achieved owing to preflight electronic examination 
and control of passengers and their luggage; 
- the probability of flights safety provision in Russia and in the USA consisting in 
preventing of trained terrorists’ penetration into a cockpit is practically the same: it 
equals to 0.52-0.53. In case of on-line warning about a highjacking and owing to this 
warning a possibility of essential opposing to terrorists this probability increases to 0.76. 
In Russia an armored door is the essential obstacle and in the USA it is a modern 
electronic examination system. According to the computations both in Russia and the 
USA the probability of terrorist’s goals achievement in case of a thorough preliminary 
training is unacceptably high. 
The drawn frightening figures (0.52-0.53) mean that the time of “single terrorists” has 
passed. They may act only on local airlines of developing countries where are no means of 
electronic examination and control of passengers. The computations allow with a high 
degree of confidence to come to the conclusion that all the taken place terrorist acts were 
committed after their thorough preliminary planning and preparing. 
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Figure 29. Results of modeling for example 8 
Conclusion: in Russia and the USA the existing before September 11 systems of flights safety 
were ineffective against planned actions of trained terrorists; the bottleneck of flights 
security provision system were a weak protection of a cockpit and absence of active 
opposing measures on board an airplane. 
Let’s answer the second question “How the level of the safety may be increased and by what 
measures?”  
It is possible to think up a set of such measures, however ways of their application should 
be carefully proved depending on the scenario of terrorists actions. We will stop only on 
some of the measures that already are implemented at the various airports.  
The 1st measure consists in using devices for recognition the special materials (including 
ceramics), in an identification of passengers by prints of fingers, in eyeball scanning, in 
using the general databases of prospective criminals, in restrictions on hand luggage. We 
will designate a measure 1 as 6th barrier in addition to considered above. We will put the 
mean time of keeping effectiveness of 1st measure equals to 1 year (i.e. for overcoming this 
barrier it should be spent about 1 year). As effective devices appear annually, we will 
estimate time before the next adequate strengthening of a measure in 1 year.  
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The measure 2 allows to suppress an energy of explosion on board in a luggage space. It is 
7th barrier. We will put the mean time of keeping effectiveness of 2nd measure equals to 5 
hours (i.e. some effect can be achieved on the average within 5 hours, commensurable in 
due course flight). As annually there are more effective remedies. Time before the next 
adequate strengthening of a measure also will be estimated in 1 year. 
The measure 3 is an armour door in a cabin of pilots (or two doors, the second door opens 
only after the first one will be locked) - it is 8th barrier. The armour door should become the 
real barrier insuperable to terrorists during all flight. It is necessary to notice, that this 
measure will not secure the members of crew serving passengers. Thus unlike 4th barrier 
the mean time of keeping effectiveness of 3rd measure logically increases. We will put, that 
it is commensurable with duration of flight and equals to 5 hours.  
The 4th measure consists in monitoring behind passenger salon by means of videocameras. 
As soon as the cabin of pilots becomes unapproachable it can be transformed into the 
situation center of safety of passenger salon. Thereby before pilots, and also the land officers 
the real picture of an events opens. They will have access to complete and valid information 
on board. We will consider a monitoring on board from the auxiliary point of view for other 
additional measures. 
The measure 5 is a special service of flight. At the same time the boomerang effect is possible 
- terrorists can detonate an explosive after having encountered resistance from special 
service. And if terrorists can disarm a specialist of special service, they will have an 
additional weapon. It is 9th barrier. We will put the mean time of keeping effectiveness of 
5th measure equals to 1 hour (i.e. a specialist of special service can be detected in average for 
1 hour and an effect of it is not clear). The period between strengthenings of special services 
we will estimate in 5 years. 
The measure 6 is formed from special measures of counteraction (temporary 
depressurization of salon, not lethal influence). Really it is 10th barrier. For the explanatory 
of this measure we will consider some scenario reasons: 
a. as counter-attracting maneuver at average altitude the salon can be temporarily 
depressurized for a disorientation of terrorists and granting of the initiative to crew and 
special service of flight (that at a low altitude this measure may be inefficient, and at a 
high altitude it will quickly lead to irreparable consequences);  
b. terrorists are obliged to be active, for this purpose those from them which have found 
out itself obviously, are in standing position, passengers – in sedentary. The first 
problem of protection is to destroy these subjects of threats at least for some minutes. 
And means of not lethal influence should be used because of passengers can also be 
influenced simultaneously. Then 6th measure is capability of using means of dot not 
lethal influence on the revealed terrorists. It may be influences by lulling gas and-or 
short-term shocking influences (for instance, blinding and-or deafening and-or the 
influences of electroshock type leading to a temporary loss of consciousness). The ways 
of influence should be a little, because against one way a simple counteraction can be 
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found (against gas – a gas mask, against blinding – goggles and so on). Thereby some 
revealed terrorists can be practically neutralized. 
As at salon there can be the accomplices capable to recapture after additional preparation, 
methods of compulsory keeping of suspicious passengers on the places before emergency 
landing should be made. It is one of versions within the limits of 6th measure (which can 
be used by the individual lulling influence and-or jammed fastening, etc. Considering 
possible variants, we will put, that the mean time of keeping effectiveness of 6th measure 
equals to 5 hours (commensurable in due course flight). The period between 
strengthenings of 6th measure we will estimate at 2 hours taking into account various 
possible variants. 
All listed measures seem at first sight rather impressive, but how much they are effective? 
Really, their effectiveness should be proved quantitatively! This is a very complicated task. 
It is impossible to make natural experiments. We may only use mathematical models.  
Analysis of results has shown, that after implementation of the described measures the 
integrated risk to lose complex safety of flight during 5 hours of flight against terrorist 
threats is equal to 0.000004. And if duration of threats will be increased to 5 days the risk 
raises from 0.000004 to 0.002. The last can be commented by the next interpretation: safety 
will be achieved in 998 cases from thousand hypothetical terrorist attacks. Even taking into 
account an essential error of initial scenarios and preconditions it is an obvious indicator of 
high efficiency of additional safety measures according to “precedent” principle! Still it is 
not a victory. It is clear that the first failures will make terrorists to analyze their causes and 
find new bottlenecks of the safety system thus continuing the counteraction. This 
counteraction will be ended when there are taken proactive measures which effectiveness is 
based on modelling.  
Example 9 (Information security). In quality management measures of protection of 
valuable resources from an unauthorized access (UAA) should be provided. The most 
important for any enterprise are information and software resources of an IS. We will 
consider the approach to an estimation of IS security against UAA and information 
confidentiality. A resources protection from UAA is a sequence of barriers. If a violator 
overcomes these barriers he gets access to IS information and/or software resources. In the 
Table 2 there are shown supposed characteristics of barriers and mean time of their 
overcoming by a specially trained violator (real values of such characteristics may be drawn 
as a result of actual tests or use of models not included in the monograph). It is required to 
estimate IS protection against UAA. 
Solution. We’ll try to answer this question by the subsystems “Protection from 
unauthorized access” and “Confidentiality” of CEISOQ+. The analysis of computed 
dependencies (see Figure 30 left) shows the next. The barriers 1,2,3 will be overcome with 
the probability equal to 0.63. However, monthly password changing for barriers 4, 5, 6 
allows to increase the protection probability from 0.37 to 0.94 but the level of IS protection 
(the first six barriers) is still low. The introducing of 7,8,9 barriers is useless because it does 
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not practically increase the level of IS protection. The use of cryptography allows to increase 
the level of IS protection to 0.999. This is probability for all time of IS operation (i.e. about 
20-30 years). It is possible to establish a conclusion, that with the use of cryptographic 
devices the achieved protection level exceeds similar level of quality and safety for processes 
from examples above. But according to “precedent” principle this level of protection can’t be 
recommended as high customer requirements for every cases.  
 
Barrier The frequency 
of  
barrier 
parameter 
value changes 
The mean time 
of the barrier 
overcoming  
Possible way of the barrier  
overcoming 
1. Guarded territory Every 2 hours 30 min. Unespied penetration on the 
territory  
2. Admission system for 
coming into office 
Once a day 10 min. Documents forgery, fraud 
3. Electronic key for 
powering the computer 
Every 5 years 
(MTBF = 5 
years) 
1 week Theft, collusion, forced 
confiscating 
4. Password to login  Once a month 1 month Collusion, forced extortion, 
spying, password decoding 
5. Password for access to 
devices 
Once a month 10 days Collusion, forced extortion, 
spying, password decoding 
6. Password for requesting 
information resources 
Once a month 10 days Collusion, forced extortion, 
spying, password decoding 
7. Registered device for 
information recording 
Once a year 1 day Theft, collusion, forced 
confiscating 
8. Confirmation of user 
authenticity during a 
computer session 
Once a month 1 day Collusion, forced extortion, 
spying 
9. Television monitoring Once a 5 years  
(MTBF = 5 
years) 
2 days Collusion, disrepair imitation, 
force roller 
10. Cryptosystem 1 key a month 2 years Collusion, deciphering 
Table 2. Input for modelling 
Let's look on example condition more widely. The violator is interested in a certain IS 
resources during a certain period of time. This period is called the period of objective 
confidentiality. Unlike UAA information confidentiality should be provided within these 
lasting 7 days. Fig. 30 (right) shows how this period influences on protection:  
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- in comparison with the results above the use of the first 5 barriers provides 
confidentiality during 7 days on the level 0.98 which is more higher than protection 
from UAA by the 9 barriers (0.946 – see Fig. 30 left);  
- the use of all the 10 barriers provides the required confidentiality on the level 0.99997. It 
eliminates the customer’s risk in providing system protection. It explains the role of a 
considered period of objective confidentiality – its consideration allows to understand, 
that real protection of resources during 7 days is essentially higher - 0.99997 against 0.999!  
 
 
Figure 30. Comparison of protection levels  
Example 10 (Forecasts of risks for complex multipurpose system). Let's consider a 
hypothetic multipurpose system which formally composed from functional system (similar, 
for instance, to commerce system, enterprise non-destroying control system or system of 
foods preservation from examples 2, 4, 5), gathering and data processing systems (similar to 
SCADA system from example 3), system of fire extinguishing (from example 6), system of 
engineering equipment for enterprise object (from example 7), information security system 
(from example 9). «The human factor» is considered in the parameters of control, 
monitoring and integrity recovery measures for corresponding elements. It is supposed, that 
a required integrity of system is not lost, if during given time a required integrity is not lost 
by all subsystems: “And” by 1st subsystem, “And” by 2nd subsystem, … “And” by the last 
6th subsystem (the logic illustrated by Fig. 12). It is required to estimate the measures of risk 
management, including the periodic control and, where it is possible, continuous 
monitoring of integrity of each components – see Figure 31. 
The input for subsystem 1-6 is described in examples 2-7, 9. The general results of complex 
forecasting of risk are reflected by Figure 32. Analysis of results shows, that with using of 
measures of the periodic control and where it is possible, monitoring of elements operation, 
the integrated risk to lose integrity of system during operational 1 – 4 years is changing from 
0.11 to 0.67.  
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Figure 31. The formal scheme of multipurpose system for a complex risks evaluation 
The general logic proposition is right for a given period of forecasting: as a rule, the risk to 
lose system integrity increases in depending on increasing time period. But there are the 
features demanding a logic explanation. Serrated and nonmonotonic character of 
dependence on Figure 32 is explained by the periodic diagnostics of elements, monitoring 
presence or absence and their quantitative values. Let's remind: for every monitored 
element a penetration of a danger source and its activation is possible only if an operator-
monitor makes an error but a dangerous influence occurs if the danger is activated before 
the next diagnostic. Otherwise the source will be detected and neutralized. Immediately 
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after element diagnostic the risk decreases because during diagnostic all dangers are 
detected and neutralized and at the beginning of a period after diagnostic dangerous 
influences don’t have enough time to accumulate and be activated. Nonetheless, there is a 
lack of protection accumulated for the previous full periods that’s why the risk doesn’t 
decrease to 0 for every element. By the middle of a period between neighboring diagnostics 
there is an increase of the calculated risk because new danger sources can begin to influence. 
Moreover, for the longer period of forecasting monitoring possibilities are weaken, thereby 
the moment of operator error comes nearer. And, if on timeline the following diagnostic 
does not come yet, risk increases. Similar effects paradoxes are explained – for example, that 
risk to lose integrity during 2.96 years (0.58) is more, than risk during more long time - 3.12 
years, 58 days longer (0.57). One more effect of modelling: if to do forecasting not for 2.04 
years, and for 2 weeks longer (2.08 years, i.e. 2% longer period) the expected risk to lose 
system integrity increases from 0.28 to 0.36. This is higher on 28 %! These results of 
modelling should serve as a substantiation for development of predicting counter-measures.  
 
Figure 32. Integrated risk to lose integrity of system during operational 1 – 4 years 
Indeed, on the basis of a rational choice of parametres for technologies of the  
control, monitoring and integrity recovery an optimization of processes offered in work is 
possible.  
6. Conclusion 
Rational management means wide use of existing models and software tools for decision-
making in life cycle of systems. The criteria used for rational management are maximization 
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of a prize (profit, a degree of quality or safety, etc.) at limits on expenses or minimization of 
expenses at limits on a comprehensible degree of quality and-or safety or their combination.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 33. The proposed results helps to answer the questions «What rational measures should lead to 
estimated effect without waste expenses, when, by which controllable and uncontrollable conditions 
and costs?» 
As a result of adequate modelling more deep and extend knowledge of system allows the 
customer to formulate well-reasoned system requirements. And it is rational to developer 
to execute them without excessive expenses of resources, and to the user – as much as 
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possible effectively to implement in practice the incorporated power of system.The 
presented models, methods and software tools, allowing to forecast quality and risks 
according to system requirements of standards, are real levers to analyze and optimize 
system processes and improve quality management. The investigated practical examples 
demonstrated their functionality and possibilities to use "precedent principle» for 
definition the justified levels of acceptable quality and admissible risks. For complex 
systems the proposed results helps to answer the questions «What rational measures 
should lead to estimated effect without waste expenses, when, by which controllable and 
uncontrollable conditions and costs?» and allows to go «from a pragmatical filtration of 
information to generation of the proved ideas and effective decisions» (see Figure 33). The 
effect from implementation in system life cycle is commensurable with expenses for system 
creation.  
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